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Abstract 
 
An Abstract of a Dissertation Submitted to Nova Southeastern University 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
An Empirical Investigation of Factors Affecting Resistance to Using 
Multi-Authentication Systems in Public-Access Environments 
 
by 
Joseph W. Marnell 
May, 2016 
 
Over the course of history, different means of object and person identification as well as 
verification have evolved for user authentication. In recent years, a new concern has emerged 
regarding the accuracy of verifiable authentication and protection of personal identifying 
information (PII), because previous misuses have resulted in significant financial loss. Such 
losses have escalated more noticeably because of human identity-theft incidents due to breaches 
of PII within multiple public-access environments. Although the use of various biometric and 
radio frequency identification (RFID) technologies is expanding, resistance to using these 
technologies for user authentication remains an issue. This study addressed the effect of 
individuals’ perceptions on their resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (RMS) 
in public-access environments and uncovered key constructs that may significantly contribute to 
such resistance. 
 
This study was a predictive study to assess the contributions of individuals’ perceptions of the 
importance of organizational protection of their PII, noted as Perceived Value of Organizational 
Protection of PII (PVOP), authentication complexity (AC), and invasion of privacy (IOP) on 
their resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (RMS) in public-access 
environments. Moreover, this study also investigated if there were any significant differences on 
the aforementioned constructs based on age, gender, prior experience with identity theft, and 
acquaintance experience with identity theft. As part of this study, a rollout project was 
implemented of multi-factor biometric and RFID technologies for system authentication prior to 
electronic-commerce (e-commerce) use in public-access environments. The experimental group 
experienced the multi-factor authentication and also was trained on its use. Computer users 
(faculty & students) from a small, private university participated in the study to determine their 
level of PVOP, IOP, and AC on their resistance to using the technology in public-access 
environments. Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) was used to formulate a model and test 
predictive power along with the significance of the contribution of the aforementioned constructs 
on RMS. The results show that all construct measures demonstrated very high reliability. The 
results also indicate that the experimental group of the multi-factor authentication had lower 
resistance than the control group that didn’t use the technology. The mean increases indicate an 
overall statistically significant difference between the experimental and control groups overall. 
The results also demonstrate that students and participants’ increased levels of education indicate 
an overall statistically significant decrease in resistance. The findings demonstrate that overall 
computer authentication training do provide added value in the context of measuring resistance 
to using newer multi-method authentication technology. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Background  
Recent research suggested that electronic-commerce (e-commerce) transactions are not the 
primary source of identity theft (IDT) (Shareef & Kumar, 2012). However, Shareef et al. (2012) 
stated that IDT plays a substantial role in purchase resistance for consumers of e-commerce. 
Increasing demands to prevent IDT are advocated in recent literature, newspapers, and 
government policies. According to Shareef et al. (2012), “current research addresses the issues of 
identity theft; source, type, and preventative measuring tools” (p. 30). Additional studies 
indicated that inadequate user authentication (UA) methods are a contributing factor for IDT 
(Fichtman, 2001). A national survey conducted by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (2008) 
revealed that 4.7% of American adults experienced IDT that involved the loss of personal 
identifying information (PII). Industry responses to combat aspects of IDT are focused on the 
verifiable identification of individuals through the development of acceptable multi-method 
authentication systems (Bellah, 2001). While current research has reflected significant advances 
in biometric recognition, users continue to resist using biometric technology to enhance 
password security (Levy & Ramim, 2009). This resistance is attributed to concerns related to 
protecting their PII, invasion of privacy (IOP), and authentication complexity (AC). 
The problem with IDT has escalated as a result of users sharing, reusing, and losing 
passwords, as well as the mishandling of PII during e-commerce transactions (Furnell, Dowland, 
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Illingworth, & Reynolds, 2000). This has resulted in significant losses from illegal authentication 
and theft of PII. Efforts to combat the weaknesses in current methods of username/password 
entries have influenced the development of biometric forms of identification (Altinkemer & 
Wang, 2011). However, single-authentication biometrics still exhibit misreads and errors, so 
organizations have turned to testing multi-method authentication systems for UA (Gunson, 
Marshall, Morton, & Jack, 2010). Increased monetary losses occurring due to privacy attacks 
during e-commerce activities within organizations have swayed individuals’ perceptions of the 
importance of protecting PII (PVOP), lessened their use of Internet purchasing, and could 
influence their resistance to new authentication methods (Dowling & Staelin, 1995; Mayer, 
Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Thus, this study was designed to empirically test the validity of a 
model on the contribution of the constructs of PVOP, IOP, and AC on individual’s resistance to 
using multi-method authentication systems (RMS) in public-access environments. Additionally, 
this study addressed a gap in the UA literature linking UA and RMS. This was accomplished by 
assessing individuals’ usage of RMS in a university setting.  
The remainder of this investigation addressed individuals’ RMS that undermines 
organizations’ efforts to achieve enhanced protection of PII during UA, which was the guiding 
research problem for this study. Following the problem statement discussion is the main goal and 
the guiding research question. This study identified the hypotheses that stem from the main 
research question. Next, a discussion of this study’s limitations, delimitations, and barriers is 
provided. Finally, this investigation concludes with a description of the approach that serves as 
the foundation for the methodology used by the study, while ending with definitions and a 
summary. 
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Problem Statement 
The research problem investigated was identity-theft (IDT) incidents due to breaches of 
personal identifying information (PII) (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003; Zviran & 
Erlich, 2006). Such PII breaches are significant threats to invasion of privacy (IOP) during e-
commerce activities by users in public-access environments (Venkatesh et al., 2003; Zviran & 
Erlich, 2006). Kim, Jeong, Kim, and So (2011) identified PII as financial card numbers, 
usernames, passwords, medical records, driver’s licenses, and Social Security numbers (Kim et 
al., 2011). These PII represent targets of online theft during e-commerce activities. Doolin, 
Dillon, Thompson, and Corner (2005) defined e-commerce as information networks that enable 
data flow for business, capital, and logistical support. Existing methods to protect PII during e-
commerce activities are based on three types of authentication: username/password, tokens/smart 
cards, and biometrics (Levy & Ramim, 2009; Millett & Holden, 2003). 
IDT is defined as the misuse of another individual’s PII to commit acts of intentional fraud 
involving financial and personal information (Hinde, 2005; Wendels, Mählmann, & Versen, 
2009). Financial-crime investigators regard IDT fraud as the intentional concealment of the 
illegal act of using another's identity to derive a benefit at someone else’s expense (Bolton & 
Hand, 2002; Gottschalk, 2010). Jerman-Blažič and Klobucar (2005) defined IOP as “intrusion 
into the private life or affairs of an individual when that intrusion results from undue or illegal 
gathering and use of data” (p. 576). An IDT imposter commits these acts to obtain credit, 
merchandise, services, and money in the name of the victim (Laudon & Laudon, 2010).  
It appears that individuals’ perceptions of the importance of protecting PII, noted as 
Perceived Value of Organizational Protection of PII (PVOP), from financial and privacy attacks 
is related to their resistance to using various types of authentication (Dowling & Staelin, 1994; 
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Mayer et al., 1995). PVOP is defined as the value individuals place on protecting their PII, 
because of the potential consequences of being vulnerable to the actions of another party during 
e-commerce activities (Dowling & Staelin, 1994; Mayer et al., 1995). Prior research suggests 
that members of social media websites, for example, are experiencing increasing levels of PVOP 
because of IDT incidents from PII exposure (Nosko, Wood, & Molema, 2010).  
Illegal access to PII enables an unauthorized person to use, copy, release, destroy, deny, or 
modify hardware, software, data, or network resources (O’Brien, 2002). According to Eisenstein 
(2008) and Kim et al. (2011), financial losses are incurred due to failure of merchants to protect 
customer data from unauthorized access. Such losses can occur as a result of stolen mail, 
computer data breaches, illegal access to Websites such as PayPal, computer viruses, phishing 
scams, packet sniffing, wiretapping, and paper-document theft (Eisenstein, 2008; Kim et al., 
2011). Financial losses due to IDT incidents have deterred 75% of online users from attempting 
as many purchases (Lai, Li, & Hsieh, 2012).  
Monetary losses incurred by individuals continue to increase as e-commerce payment 
activities flourish (Bhattacharyya, Jha, Tharakunnel, & Westland, 2011). A previous study of e-
commerce purchases indicated that IDT occurrences can be influenced by demographics and 
geography (Higgins, Hughes, Ricketts, & Wolfe, 2008). These occurrences have resulted in 11.6 
million victims in 2011, representing a 13% increase over 2010 (Javelin Strategy & Research, 
2012). Publicly-reported security breaches for 2011 totaled 22,918,441 (Identity Theft Center, 
2012).  
The security breaches resulting from IDT incidents of PII have influenced efforts to reduce 
losses through improving authentication security (Altinkemer & Wang, 2011). According to Al-
Harbi and Osborn (2011), user access involves users, roles, and authentication permissions that 
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allow specific interactions with a resource. The user interactions result in the flow of information 
based on specific privileges within permissible rules and error allowances (Al-Harbi & Osborn, 
2011). According to Levy and Ramim (2009), authentication uses the two elements of 
identification and verification to validate an identity through “enabled authentication protocols 
that establish the identification processes between the host and the user” (p. 382).  
User authentication (UA) methods that reduce PII loss include “something the user knows 
(e.g. password or personal identification number (PIN)), something the user has (e.g. a card or 
other token) and something the user is (e.g. a biometric characteristic)” (Furnell, Papadopoulos, 
& Dowland, 2004, p. 529). Complexities of multiple layers of UA appear to be increasing 
(Barton, Byciuk, Harris, Schumack, & Webster, 2005). Furthermore, various biometrics are 
interpreted incorrectly and issue high false-rejection rates (FRR). These multiple layers represent 
combinations of unique biometric physical or behavioral characteristics currently used for 
validating authentication with hand, eye, face, or voice features (Barton et al., 2005). 
Millett and Holden (2003) defined UA as any identifier-forming process that distinguishes an 
individual's username/password, token/smart card, retina, voice, or other forms of recognition. 
Furnell et al. (2000) stated that UA is “an essential first line of defense in the security of 
Information Technology systems” (p. 529). According to Chandra and Calderon (2005), accurate 
identification, as well as verification, of users is based on confidentiality, availability, integrity, 
authorization, audit, and non-repudiation factors. While users prefer the simplicity of traditional 
username/password authentication, history reflects those methods are limited and not a strong 
enough means of authentication (Adams & Sasse, 1999). These limitations are attributed to 
password attacks by malware, phishing, and reuse technologies (Adams & Sasse, 1999). 
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Furnell et al. (2000) defined authentication complexity (AC) as issues that complicate UA 
based on effectiveness, cost, and user acceptance. Other issues adding complexity to UA include 
users’ tokens being lost, stolen, or misplaced, as well as sharing, forgetting, and reusing 
passwords (Furnell et al., 2000). The increase of malicious attacks on systems to obtain PII is 
intensifying AC (Pearce, Zeadally, & Hunt, 2010). Gritzalis (2004) suggested that protection 
from IOP was based on users’ “ability to control the terms by which their personal information is 
collected and used” (p. 195). However, users willingly choose to overlook IOP to minimize AC 
by circumventing security methods in favor of expediency and practicality (Adams & Sasse, 
1999). Thus, a simpler, more secure UA that minimizes AC may need to be established by 
utilizing multiple means of authentication that are verifiable, effective, affordable, and user-
friendly (Furnell et al., 2004; Tsalakanidou, Malassiotis, & Strintzis, 2007). Conversely, 
enhancing security may result in increasing the complexity of authentication methods (Furnell et 
al., 2004; Tsalakanidou et al., 2007).  
Resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (RMS) is defined as the reluctance 
to accept alternative methods of user verification due to perceived security, complexity, and 
privacy concerns (Bellah, 2001; Van Hoose, 2008). Such resistance has been linked to various 
types of authentication systems (Jones, 1991; Wang & Petrison, 1993). Resistance can also be 
attributed to intrusiveness and the perception of potential IOP (Zviran & Erlich, 2006). Industry 
trends are moving toward the use of multi-method authentication systems with recognizable 
biological human characteristics beyond the traditional fingerprints that include DNA, voice 
recognition, and eye patterns (Bolton & Hand, 2002; Gottschalk, 2010). In fact, 83% of mobile 
users indicated an acceptance of some form of biometrics for improved mobile telephone 
security, while more than 30% were unwilling to use currently available pin-type methods 
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because of problems related to AC (Clarke & Furnell, 2005). Some research suggests that 
expectation of improved authentication accuracy with less complexity could decrease RMS 
(Clark & Furnell, 2005; Jain & Ross, 2004; Levy & Ramim, 2009; Ross, Nandakumar, & Jain, 
2006). However, because of the increasing complexity of previous UA methods, the use of 
defense-in-depth approaches with multi-method authentication systems is escalating (Pearce et 
al., 2010).  
According to Jones (1991), as well as Wang and Petrison (1993), it appears that individuals’ 
perceptions of the importance of protecting their PII is related to their resistance to using various 
types of multi-method authentication systems. Having said that, little is known about the role of 
individuals’ perceptions of authentication complexity and the importance of protecting their PII 
on their RMS. Therefore, it appears that additional research on the factors of authentication 
complexity, perceived invasion of privacy, and individuals’ perceptions about the perceived 
value of organizational protection of their PII is warranted in predicting resistance to using 
various types of authentication. 
 
Dissertation Goal 
The main goal of this proposed research study was to assess empirically individuals’ 
perspectives on the contribution of perceived value of organizational protection of their personal 
identifying information (PII) (PVOP), perceived invasion of privacy (IOP), and authentication 
complexity (AC) on their resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (RMS) in 
public-access environments. PVOP, IOP, and AC are the independent variables (IV) in this 
research study. The dependent variable (DV) in this research study is RMS. This research study 
assessed the difference in PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS in public-access environments based on 
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individuals’ age (AGE), gender (GEN), degree major (DM), academic level (AL), prior 
experience with identity theft (EXP), and acquaintance experience with identity theft (EXA), the 
six control variables. Assessing RMS during e-commerce activities may reveal how best to lower 
IDT losses (Doolin et al., 2005; Roussos & Moussouri, 2004). This study builds on previous 
research by Altinkemer and Wang (2011), as well as Roussos and Moussouri (2004), which 
suggested that the integration of multi-method authentication systems for identity verification in 
public-access environments could minimize IDT. Furthermore, Altinkemer and Wang (2011) 
recommended additional research into multi-method authentication systems to secure user 
authentication entries. Prior research by Klaus, Wingreen, and Blanton (2010) suggested that 
reducing losses from goods and services purchased illegally through IDT will require institutions 
to provide a means of minimizing the number of users affected by AC. 
According to Venkatesh et al. (2003), resistance to accepting emerging technology is based 
on the difference between an individual’s non-adoption and his or her acceptance levels. Thus, 
resistance on the part of individuals may be the cause of significant failures in the 
implementation of multi-method authentication systems (Robey, Ross, & Boudreau, 2002). 
Furthermore, previous studies in ubiquitous environments suggested that numerous factors can 
influence individuals’ resistance to technology (Karyda, Gritzalis, Park, & Kokolakis, 2009). 
Although PVOP, IOP, and AC have all been referenced in prior research, it appears that very 
little attention has been given to the development of a predictive model of RMS that incorporates 
such constructs in public-access environments. Therefore, despite the many benefits of multi-
method authentication systems noted by researchers (Attaran, 2006; Gunson et al., 2010; Levy & 
Ramim, 2009; Roussos & Moussouri, 2004), a considerable number of individuals are still not 
using multi-method authentication systems to conduct e-commerce activities. Moreover, a 
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significant number of individuals consider the authentication process to be too complex or too 
invasive of their protected information (Attaran, 2006; Gunson et al., 2010; Levy & Ramim, 
2009; Roussos & Moussouri, 2004). However, this has not deterred substantial numbers of 
retailers and government agencies from testing various forms of biometrics for identification 
purposes (Clodfelter, 2010). Biometric systems use two phases of operation consisting of 
enrollment and authentication. The enrollment process requires the collection of biometric data, 
identity linking, and storage through the various forms of biometric technology such as finger-
print scanning. The authentication process consists of the verification of an individual against the 
enrollment biometric data collected previously (Clodfelter, 2010).  
Previous studies suggested that divergent age levels exhibiting different responses and 
intentions could be useful for identifying potential IDT expectations (Venkatesh et al., 2003; 
Zviran & Erlich, 2006). To help address and reduce IDT, the IVs warrant further research, since 
much of the prior research regarding factors affecting RMS focused on IVs separately 
(Venkatesh et al., 2003; Zviran & Erlich, 2006). Despite the previous literature, little attention 
has been given to assessing PVOP, IOP, and AC as they relate to individuals’ age (AGE), gender 
(GEN), degree major (DM), academic level (AL), prior experience with identity theft (EXP), and 
acquaintance experience with identity theft (EXA), demographic indicators which appear to 
affect resistance to using RMS in public-access environments.  
This study builds on previous work with types of human, object, and biometric authentication 
methods by Attaran (2006), Gunson et al. (2010), Levy and Ramim (2009), as well as Roussos 
and Moussouri (2004) that might warrant consideration as a way to reduce RMS within the 
context of public-access environments. There are six specific goals of this research study. The 
first three specific goals are to investigate empirically the contribution of PVOP, IOP, and AC to 
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RMS, respectively, in public-access environments. The fourth specific goal is to investigate 
empirically the contribution of the interaction of the three independent variables, PVOP, IOP, 
and AC on individuals’ RMS in public-access environments. The fifth specific goal is to 
investigate empirically whether any significant differences of PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS exist 
based on individuals’ age (AGE), gender (GEN), degree major (DM), academic level (AL), 
person’s prior experience with identity theft (EXP), and person’s acquaintance experience with 
identity theft (EXA). The sixth specific goal is to investigate empirically whether any significant 
differences of PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS exist based on individuals who have used the multi-
method authentication system and those who haven’t, as well as, student and faculty, in public 
access environments. 
 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
The main research question (RQ) that this study addressed was: What is the contribution of 
PVOP, IOP, AC, and the interaction on individuals’ resistance to using multi-method 
authentication systems in public-access environments?  
In addressing the main RQ, this study addressed 11 specific hypotheses (noted in null form): 
H1: Individuals’ Perceived Value of Organizational Protecting PII (PVOP) will have no 
statistically significant influence on individuals’ resistance to using a multi-method 
authentication system (RMS) in public-access environments. 
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H2: Invasion of Privacy (IOP) will have no statistically significant influence on individuals’ 
resistance to using a multi-method authentication system (RMS) in public-access 
environments. 
H3: Authentication Complexity (AC) will have no statistically significant influence on 
individuals’ resistance to using a multi-method authentication system (RMS) in public-
access environments. 
H4: There will be no significant interaction effect of PVOP, IOP, and AC on individuals’ 
resistance to using a multi-method authentication system (RMS) in public-access 
environments. 
H5a: PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS will have no statistically significant difference based on age 
(AGE). 
H5b: PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS will have no statistically significant difference based on  
 gender (GEN). 
H5c: PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS will have no statistically significant difference based on 
person’s degree major (DM). 
H5d: PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS will have no statistically significant difference based on 
academic level (AL). 
H5e: PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS will have no statistically significant difference based on 
person’s prior experience with identity theft (EXP). 
H5f: PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS will have no statistically significant difference based on person’s 
acquaintance experience with identity theft (EXA). 
12 
 
 
 
 
             H6  
          
H6: There will be no statistically significant differences on PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS based on 
individuals who used a multi-method authentication system in public-access environments 
and those who haven't, as well as Student and Faculty in public-access environments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1. Conceptual Model for Predicting RMS in public-access environments. 
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Relevance and Significance 
 
Relevance 
 
This study provided further research into the factors that influence individuals’ RMS 
(Gunson et al., 2010). However, a review of the literature reveals limited studies focusing on 
resistance to using multi-method authentication systems as it relates to minimizing IDT in public 
access environments. This study is relevant, as it investigated users' RMS in public-access 
environments, leading to an improved understanding of the factors that contribute to user multi-
method authentication resistance. The public access areas encompass sporting events, national 
and state borders, hospitals, as well as airports. According to Anderson et al. (2008), in a survey 
conducted by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (2003), IDT was considered one of the 
greatest threats to the U.S. economy. Additional surveys were conducted by Gartner, Inc. in 
2003, as well as the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) and the U.S. Department 
of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics in 2006 (Anderson et al., 2008).  Furnell (2007c) indicated 
that false identity, identity theft in the form of PII, and other forms of impersonation now 
affecting an increasing number of victims are due to the attractiveness of these financial 
propositions to criminals. Thus, identity fraud leading to theft can be accomplished easily by 
only gaining someone’s name and address to cause them significant inconvenience through 
impersonation (Furnell, 2007a). Furthermore, Furnell and Clarke (2012) implied that in spite of 
technological advances and the strengthening of policies, people represent a critical element for 
the achieving or failing of security systems that protect PII. Equally important was the study by 
Allison, Schuck, and Lersch (2005), which indicated that the reporting of “identity theft appeared 
to be larger than those of other theft-oriented offenses-credit card fraud, check fraud, robbery, 
and motor vehicle theft” (p. 28). While IDT is not as interesting as crimes of violence, it does 
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require more research to alleviate its impact on society (Allison et al. (2005). An additional 
research study examined username/password-authentication methods related to biometric 
mechanisms (Venkatesh et al., 2003). However, the consensus among researchers is that more 
focus needs to be placed on AC, as it significantly impacts PII security (Furnell, 2007b; Levy, 
2007c). According to Furnell (2008), increasing use of PII by merchants and e-commerce users’ 
misuse of passwords, places individuals at greater risk of IDT, as well as requires greater 
protection of remotely stored PII.  
Significance 
 
This research is significant, as it advanced current research in resistance to using various 
forms of multi-method authentication systems by increasing the body of knowledge regarding 
the factors that contribute to individuals’ authentication behaviors in public-access environments. 
The impact of illegal access to PII from the ongoing practice of carelessly sharing and reusing 
passwords increases financial risks to users (Hazari, Hargave, & Clenney, 2008; Furnell, 2008). 
The potential results of the study provided valuable information that could influence future 
strategies to secure user authentication identification, as well as address the need for further 
examination of individual RMS (Doolin et al., 2005; Palmer, 2008). This could potentially help 
to lower IDT occurrences by examining multi-method authentication systems that influence 
users’ resistance to technology. 
Insight into strategies for reducing the complexity of multi-method authentication systems 
through biometrics is of significance to all who participate in e-commerce (Nandakumar, 2008). 
According to Hazari et al. (2008), understanding users’ password behaviors could be of 
significance when examining AC. Enhanced forms of cyber security risks are becoming more 
prevalent, especially those involved in the fight against increasing IDT (Identity Theft Resource 
15 
 
 
 
Center, 2012). User authentication is considered a privacy risk for government, corporations, and 
users of e-commerce (Doolin et al., 2005). Achieving a secure means of user authorization for e-
commerce transactions would greatly assist hospitals, businesses, and government organizations 
in developing, as well as implementing strategies, programs to secure PII effectively, while 
preventing IDT (Doolin et al., 2005; Palmer, 2010). 
 
Barriers and Issues 
There were a number of potential barriers to this study. One such barrier was obtaining the 
permission required to survey students and instructors as survey participants. Additionally, 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals from two universities were required to conduct this 
study. 
 
Limitations and Delimitations 
Limitations 
One limitation of this study was measuring the RMS of participants who were asked to 
respond to hypothetical scenarios, and who may not have understood all that was required to 
answer the questions. Compeau and Higgins (1995) recommended that individuals be asked to 
provide responses to the experiences they encounter by imagining future uses of various 
technologies. Thus, the level of difficulty in identifying individuals’ RMS was measured through 
a participant survey that required the use of biometric and/or RFID for user authentication in e-
commerce in public-access environments. According to Bandura (1977), survey participants 
should be required to answer questions based on fixed patterns of responses. In addressing this 
issue during the quantitative phase of this study, an expert review panel evaluated the quantity 
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and clarity of the questions, as well as the precision of the measurement instrument. Thus, an 
expert panel was created using both quantitative and qualitative methods to examine the survey 
instrument’s validity, while recommending modifications where needed. 
Two further limitations were the self-reporting of prior password conduct that influences 
personal behaviors, trust, and attitudes reflected in PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS. According to 
Verplanken and Orbell (2003), acknowledgment of prior behaviors and experiences of users’ 
passwords, as well as privacy concerns is not easily obtained. Additionally, there were 
equipment requirements to conduct the study that were not publicly available.  
Delimitations 
 
This study was delimited to students and staff from a single, private university located in the 
southwestern U.S. This study was limited to biometric scanning of fingerprints and RFID 
scanning with USB plug-in adapters, as well as a traditional username/password single sign-on 
authentication with a Windows 7 operating system. This method of authentication allowed user 
profiles that were capable of being identified remotely through an enterprise-wide area network 
that authenticates through a Windows server 2012 active directory system.  
 
Definition of Terms 
The following outlines various terms, as well as acronyms used along with their definition 
and description:  
Access – Users, roles, and authentication permissions that allow specific interaction with a 
resource that influences the flow of information based on specific rights, as well as privileges 
within permissible rules and error allowances (Al-Harbi & Osborn, 2011). 
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Authentication – Any process of forming identifiers that distinguish individual usernames 
and passwords along with smart cards, retina scans, voice, or other forms of recognition (Millett 
& Holden, 2003).  
Authentication Complexity (AC) – The degree to which an innovation is perceived as 
relatively difficult to understand, use for access, and authentication for electronic-data transfer in 
public-access environments (Uzoka & Ndzinge, 2009). 
Electronic-Commerce (e-commerce) – Computer electronic online commerce through 
information networks that enable data flow for business, capital, and logistical support (Doolin et 
al., 2005). 
Identity Theft (IDT) – An imposter’s intentional theft of PII to obtain credit, merchandise, or 
services in the name of the victim (Eisenstein, 2008; Kim et al., 2011). 
Identity Theft Experiences (EXP) – Incidents in which individuals are actually affected by the 
intentional theft of PII by an imposter to obtain credit, merchandise, or services in the name of 
the victim (Kim et al., 2011). 
Invasion of Privacy (IOP) – Intrusion into the private life or affairs of an individual when 
that intrusion results from undue or illegal gathering and use of data about that individual 
(Jerman-Blažič & Klobucar, 2005). 
Perceived Value of Organizational Protection of Personal Identifying Information (PVOP) – 
The value an individual places on the potential loss of his or her personal identifying 
information, represented by his or her driver’s license, credit card, Social Security number, and 
personal health information that places him or her at a great risk if not protected by organizations 
(Doolin et al., 2005). 
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Personal Identifying Information (PII) – Credit and debit card numbers, usernames, 
passwords, medical records, driver’s license, and Social Security number representing an 
individually unique person (Kim et al., 2011). 
Resistance to Using Multi-Method Authentication Systems (RMS) – A measure of someone’s 
aversion to using a certain type of authentication, based upon type and sensitivity (Jones, 1991; 
Wang & Petrison, 1993). 
 
Summary 
The purpose of chapter one is to introduce the study, identify the research problem, discuss, 
and recognize any barriers, as well as limitations to conducting this study, and to provide a 
theoretical basis for this study. The research problem this study addressed is identity-theft (IDT) 
incidents due to breaches of personal identifying information (PII) are significant threats to 
invasion of privacy (IOP) during e-commerce activities by users in public-access environments. 
Valid literature supporting the need for this research was also presented. Moreover, chapter one 
also presented the main goal, specific goals, and specific research questions that were addressed 
through this study. The main goal of this study addressed empirically individuals’ perspectives 
on the contribution of perceived value of organizational protection of their personal identifying 
information (PVOP), perceived invasion of privacy (IOP), and authentication complexity (AC) 
on their resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (RMS) in public-access 
environments. Prior literature that supports the main goal of this research was presented 
(Altinkemer & Wang, 2011; Attaran, 2006; Doolin et al., 2005; Gunson et al., 2010; Karyda, 
Gritzalis, Park & Kokolakis, 2009; Klaus, Wingreen, & Blanton, 2010; Levy & Ramim, 2009; 
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Gunson et al., 2010; Robey, Ross, & Boudreau, 2002; Roussos & Moussouri, 2004; Venkatesh et 
al., 2003). 
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
 
Introduction  
A search for previous models of implementation success validated that similar constructs 
related to user satisfaction, system quality, information quality, and IS service quality 
consistently appeared in prior studies (DeLone & McLean, 1992, 2003). While these identified 
constructs are valid, the purpose of this study moved beyond previously recognized and validated 
constructs by examining other individual constructs that appear promising as predictors of multi-
method authentication systems resistance. More specifically, the implementation success from 
the perspective of reduced resistance as described within this investigation focused only on the 
constructs of PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS. Therefore, a brief review of the literature for each of 
these key constructs was provided as a theoretical foundation for this study. This section includes 
the results of a literature search in a variety of areas that included multi-method authentication 
systems technology, IS security, identity theft, perceived value of organizational protection of 
personal identifying information, invasion of privacy, behavior, user resistance, intention to use 
technology, sociology and psychology, biometrics, radio frequency identification (RFID), 
authentication complexity, e-commerce, password usage, and research methodology.  
This review presented the literature on the constructs of identity theft, e-commerce, and 
users’ resistance to using multi-method authentication systems technology, privacy concerns, 
authentication complexity, password issues, and user behavior, in the context of the larger 
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construct of resistance to using new methods of authenticating in public access environments. 
The literature review began with a search on perceived value of organizational protection of 
personal identifying information and invasion of privacy, and ended with authentication 
complexity, as these are the three independent variables of this study. Finally, the literature 
review focused on resistance to using multi-method authentication systems in light of user 
password threats leading to significantly larger losses to individuals, as this is the dependent 
variable in this study. 
 
Perceived Value of Organizational Protection of Personal Identifying Information 
According to Dowling and Staelin (1994), as well as Mayer et al. (1995), the PVOP of PII is 
demonstrated by the elevated concerns of IOP resulting from financial losses occurring from 
IDT. These losses are increasing due to individuals exhibiting unsafe password behaviors such as 
reusing and sharing passwords, as well as the lack of awareness of the costs associated with PII 
theft (Eisenstein, 2008; Furnell, 2008; Kumar, Mohan, & Holowczak, 2008; Levy, 2008). Users 
are unaware that illegal access to PII enables unauthorized access to use, copy, and release, 
destroy, deny, or gain access to create imposter accounts (Furnell, 2008; Obrien, 2002; Rezgui & 
Marks, 2008; Shaw et al., 2008).  
According to Eisenstein (2008), PII loss stems from a variety of causes, resulting in 
significant financial loss. These occurrences include merchant failures to protect client data 
under their personal control, stolen mail, computer data breaches, as well as illegally reproduced 
pay sites such as PayPal, viruses, and phishing scams (Furnell, 2008; Kumar, 2008; Shaw et al., 
2008). Furnell (2008) identified users as (a) those informed of areas of IDT risk who are doing 
something to protect themselves, as opposed to (b) those who remain indifferent to the 
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seriousness of the loss of PII. This study followed the examples of Eisenstein (2008), Furnell 
(2008), Nosko et al. (2010), as well as Shareef and Kumar (2012), who considered individuals 
who took inadequate measures to protect themselves by being inadequately informed as being at 
greater risk of IDT due to the loss of personal identifying information that stems from an IOP. 
According to Kim et al. (2011), the need to protect PII is reflected in the vast landscape of 
opportunities for theft. Financial card numbers, usernames, passwords, medical records, drivers’ 
licenses, and Social Security numbers are defined as PII. These are some of the primary targets 
for online theft. The definition of PII is supported in literature through a review of user 
awareness of their PII and the need to protect it (Furnell, 2008; Kim et al., 2011; McDaniel, 
1994). 
In a group of three studies of 400 randomly selected, accessible, personal profiles from eight 
Canadian FacebookTM networks, Nosko et al. (2010) investigated the following: (a) a checklist 
instrument to summarize disclosed PII on FacebookTM profiles, (b) PII at most risk of disclosure 
in banks, schools, and jobs in potentially threatening ways, and (c) which, age, gender, 
relationship, and network had the most influence on which user was most likely to reveal PII. For 
some of the online social networking participants, a significant quantity of PII was shared, and 
certain types of data were determined to be more likely to be revealed than other data types. 
However, those items containing personal contact information did not result in substantial 
conclusions due to factors such as age, gender, marital relationship status or a connection to a 
particular network. However, one significant trend reflected that, as age increased, so did trust 
issues regarding PII loss security concerns. Therefore, age became an easy target of value by 
illegal users due to the extremely sensitive nature of PII. According to Nosko et al. (2010), their 
“study was important because it provided evidence that highly personal, sensitive, and 
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potentially stigmatizing information is being disclosed on social networking sites” (p. 416). 
Therefore, some users express greater caution regarding PII exposure due to the increasing 
evidence of online identity theft and cyber bullying occurrences. Thus, the results of their study 
indicate the need for further development of programs and interventions to protect users, as well 
as their PII that may be at risk through identity exposure (Nosko et al., 2010). 
In a second study, Furnell et al. (2008) investigated 20 novice users’ (a) understanding of the 
potential security threats to their PII, (b) awareness, as well as usage, of security measures 
required to protect PII, (c) perceptions and behaviors regarding PII security measures, and (d) 
other related factors that restrict protection of the users’ PII online. Furthermore, recent evidence 
indicates home users are now targets in 95% of attacks (Symantec, 2006). According to Furnell 
et al. (2008) evidence suggests that users are “ultimately responsible for their own systems, and 
may often lack the knowledge or inclination to take steps to protect themselves” (p. 235). 
Furthermore, sample results indicated that novice users have credibility issues with online 
behavior which include password, credit, and debit card usage, anti-virus programs, as well as 
safe site viewing. Furnell et al. (2008) suggested that users indicated a “lack of understanding of 
both the potential impact of the threats and the required scope of protection” (p. 237). However, 
the interview transcripts indicate that novice users had some exposure to threats that placed their 
PII at risk, with credit card, online banking, and malware being the most recognizable categories 
identified. Thus, novice users’ exhibited a level of interest in learning methods that might better 
protect their PII (Furnell et al., 2008).  
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Invasion of Privacy 
According to Altman (1976), the “concept of privacy appears in the literature of several 
disciplines-psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, law, architecture, and the 
design professions” (p. 7). Furthermore, privacy is considered an interpersonal boundary control 
process that accentuates seclusion, withdrawal, and the avoidance of interaction with others. 
According to Westin (1967), the part of the individual in this epic battle of PII disclosure 
indicates that: 
Each individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in 
which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and 
communication of himself to others, in light of the environmental conditions and 
social norms set by the society in which he lives (p. 7). 
According to Bonner and Chiasson (2005), in spite of the extensive investigations of 
“privacy in research, government legislation and commercial privacy policies, concerns about 
privacy continue to increase” (p. 269). Thus, a careful analysis of historical privacy legislation 
suggests that the Fair Information Practices that girds up such legislation leads towards reducing 
rather than protecting privacy. However, Furnell and Clarke (2012) stated that the varying 
security elements that require active participation by end users in any environment necessitating 
authentication places those users at risk for IOP are comprised of behaviors, designs, 
deployments, configurations, and maintenance of systems.  
Current IT security efforts are attempting to minimize the incidents leading to IOP. 
According to Furnell and Thomson (2009), human aspects of password misuse due to AC, 
securing of PII, and understanding individuals’ behaviors towards protecting their PII are 
considered major challenges. According to Johnston, Eloff, and Labuschagne (2003), users 
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demonstrate a need to better acquaint themselves with the impact that security breaches 
encompass. Consequently, factors such as trust and certainty related to user interfaces, as well as 
performance reliability are impacting users’ attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors that have led to 
increased resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (Furnell & Clarke, 2012). 
However, the increased awareness of the importance of securing user PII is now motivating users 
towards multi-method authentication (Danchev, 2011). The result has been a recently-instituted 
group within the Institute of Fair Information Practices (IFIP) named WG11.12 on Human 
Aspects of Information Security and Assurance (see www.ifip11-12.org) dedicated to these 
factors. The overall scope of this research is the modifying of human behaviors or multi-method 
authentication systems to reduce complexities and IOP (Furnell & Clarke, 2012).  
According to Hough (2009), privacy crusader Alan Westin defined privacy as “the claim of 
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves, when, where, how, and to what 
extent information about themselves is communicated to others” (p. 7). However, Westin’s 
contemporary, David Flaherty, separated privacy further into four aspects of privacy sections. 
 
Four Aspects of Privacy 
Solitude: the perfect and unblemished state of privacy whereby you can easily restrict access 
to yourself from others by withdrawing your presence. 
Intimacy: this is by membership only and groups protect their members. 
Anonymity: this is a form of being “off the grid” in that you are able to protect yourself from 
ongoing public recognition or involvement. 
Reserve: this is the measure of trust that one places in others not to disclose specific 
information about oneself, such as what, where, when, and how (Hough, 2009). 
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According to Karyda and Gritzalis (2009), privacy can generally be defined as “the 
individual’s ability to control the terms by which their [sic] personal information is collected and 
used” (p. 195). Thus, the prevention of IOP could represent protection or freedom from 
interference by others (Gritzalis, 2004). The concept of acknowledging an individual’s right to 
privacy includes the factors of necessity, finality, transparency, and proportionality (Karyda & 
Gritzalis, 2009). 
Karyda and Gritzalis (2009) stated that necessity refers to the need for using PII, as well as 
recognizing other means of user identification, such as multi-method authentication systems. 
Finality identifies the usage of PII for legitimate purposes. Transparency recognizes individuals’ 
responsibility to be aware of how their PII is collected, whether by means of notification or 
consent. Lastly, proportionality represents the substance of PII collected, versus the identified 
objectives or reasons for collecting the data (Karyda & Gritzalis, 2009).  
 
Fair Information Practices 
According to Karyda and Gritzalis, (2009), doubts have arisen regarding whether efforts to 
enforce Fair Information Practices (FIP), have improved privacy protection. Moreover, Bonner 
and Chiasson (2005) stated that irrespective of the frequent attempts to address privacy in 
research, governmental legislation and commercial privacy policies, apprehensions about privacy 
continue to accelerate. Karyda and Gritzalis, (2009) stated that FIP is comprised of the 
following: 
Notification: user awareness of data collection; 
Choice and consent: user determines PII usages, right of access to collected data, protection 
of data, and the accountability of the collectors of data; 
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Anonymity and pseudonymity: applies only when identity or privacy is not at risk;  
Security and protection: varying levels of privacy protection, dependent on the PII being 
pursued. 
Access and recourse: the ability to know one’s PII and to have recourse if violated (FTD, 
1998; Karyda & Gritzalis, 2009). 
Additionally, thorough analysis of privacy legislation indicates “that the FIP that underlies 
such legislation paradoxically leads towards reducing privacy, rather than protecting it” (269). 
This seemingly contradictory statement has been attributed to individuals, rather than society or 
organizations, exercising greater control over their PII and IOP (Cate, 2006). Thus, this key 
human element of individual personal responsibility for PII protection and IOP prevention, still 
in its infancy, is the failure of knowledgeable users to prevent IOP when they know better 
(Furnell & Clarke, 2012). 
A study conducted by Furnell, Bryant, and Phippen (2007), selected 24 Websites to reflect a 
variety of interests and lifestyles to better understand public attitudes toward online security. 
From these chosen Websites, 415 users participated through a hosted survey in conjunction with 
the Trustguide Project (Lacohee, Crane, & Phippen, 2006) to assess security perceptions of UK 
home users. Furnell et al. (2007) investigated (a) participants’ awareness of security threats to 
IOP, (b) understanding the security safeguards available, (c) utilizing sources of security advice, 
(d) expectations of support systems, and (e) factors constraining the use of security amongst 
home users. Furthermore, businesses indicated that they perceived the threat heightened by the 
lack of public awareness and compromised home system risks as transcending to businesses. 
With easy financial gain and unhardened targets at home through botnets, spam, and phishing 
emails, threats to IOP are a significant area of concern for the home user community (Young, 
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2006). Thus, the insufficient level of PVOP against the risk of IDT for the year 2012, as 
indicated by Symantec’s Internet Security Threat Report, represents an average number of 
identities exposed per breach of 604,826 (Symantec, 2013). This study followed the examples of 
Furnell et al. (2007) as a means to measure individuals’ perceptions of the risk of IOP and their 
need to take steps to protect themselves from breaches of PII as a result of IDT incidents. 
 
Authentication Complexity 
 
Furnell et al. (2004) reported on a study of alternative authentication methods. Their study 
identified infrastructures as a means of coping with the increasing number of password-protected 
systems. Adding to the growing burden are Websites, resulting in the ever-increasing 
occurrences of reuse and sharing of password-sensitive authentications. Regardless, security 
personnel still prefer password and PIN usage as trade-offs, as the number of imposters and false 
alarm rates are still high. Thus, the responsibility of memorizing, not sharing, multitudes of 
passwords, and not sharing any with others is not easy, due to their inconvenience. Such issue 
can result in significant security breaches of PII and in identity theft. Sasse et al. (2001) 
conducted a study that indicated that with PINs being more difficult for customers to remember 
than passwords, individuals are resorting back to using date of birth or writing information on 
paper.  
According to Furnell et al. (2004) UA methods that provide lowered IDT occurrences are 
single-factor authentications, based on something that the user knows (e.g. passwords or PIN), 
possesses (smart card, token, or RFID device), or is (e.g. a biometric characteristics like 
fingerprints, eye retina, face, voice, etc.). Multi-factor authentication can be based on any two of 
these methods combined (Levy & Ramim, 2009; O’Gorman, 2003). Furthermore, Murdoch, 
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Drimer, Anderson, and Bond (2010) conducted a study that demonstrated that strengths in multi-
factor authentication systems indicated a remarkable decline in fraud following compulsory 
usage after implementation. This decline is significant in that other online banking fraud rose by 
55% during the same time period (Gunson et al., 2010). As a result of increased fraud leading to 
IDT, two-factor authentication use is increasing in the UK within outside vendor use. However, 
the fraud rate with single-factor authentication, within known banking entities, remains 
unaffected (Gunson et al., 2010). 
Gunson, Marshall, McInnes, and Jack (2011) conducted an experimental study based on 
usability, to assess users’ attitudes towards using an automated telephone service. Methods of 
user authentication and verification are becoming routinely automated with knowledge-based 
authentication. According to O’Gorman (2003), knowledge-based methods of authentication are 
considered very useful in security services. According to Gunson et al. (2011), users are willing 
to use this method when an environment, such as Internet banking, represents an environment or 
vendor that is a known factor and considered trustworthy. However, with the complexity of 
having to remember multiple passwords, security risks have increased. The cognitive load of 
remembering so many application passwords has led to misuse and reuse issues among users 
attempting to simplify their authentication efforts (Gunson et al., 2010). However, users within 
the same banking industry are weary of using outside vendors because of increased security 
mishaps reported (silicon.com, 2005). The questionnaire utilized in their banking experiment 
encompassed cognitive issues, differing levels of complexity, system performance, and system 
performance in comparison to human assistance. Two conclusions were identified: (a) that PIN 
numbers were preferred by users, but are less secure than voice use, and (b) security held more 
importance than convenience as multi-method was preferred over single-method authentication 
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by 67.2%. The results indicated a favorable usability score at or above 5.0 on a seven-point scale 
for both types of voiceprint use. Therefore, this study followed the examples of Venkatesh, 
Morris, Davis, G. and Davis, F. (2003) as the measure of individuals’ authentication complexity 
to minimize all difficulties in accessing required resources in public access environments.  
 
Multi-Method Authentication Systems 
With increasing demands being placed on the financial service industries, enhanced means of 
protecting PII through added security measures is being investigated (Hiltgen et al., 2006). 
According to Weir et al. (2009), mixed methods of identification are referred to as multi-method 
or two-factor authentication, versus single-factor, and are being tested in varying degrees. Two-
factor authentication is comprised of multiple objects such as card readers or tokens represented 
by ‘what you have,’ in addition to a multitude of other types of identification. These other 
identifications refer to passwords/PINs or biometric devices identified as ‘personal 
characteristics.’ Some of these recognized biometric traits are voiceprints, facial features, 
fingerprints, and gait. Additionally, radio frequency identification is increasingly being used in 
financial transactions through mobile devices. 
According to Coventry, De Angeli, and Johnson (2003), gaining secure access to sensitive 
areas through possession of held objects, knowledge, or physical characteristics has accelerated 
significantly through a multitude of consumer devices, services, vehicles, and banking interfaces. 
However, this expansion of methods to gain authentication has resulted in a battle of supremacy 
between usability, memorability of passwords, securing of PII, and a consideration of multi-
method authentication systems (Adams & Chang, 1993; Adams & Sasse, 1999; Levy & Ramim, 
2009; Yan, Blackwell, Anderson, & Grant, 2001). According to De Angeli, Coutts, Coventry, 
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Johnson, Cameron, and Fischer (2002), as well as Dhamija and Perrig (2000), the continual 
upgrading of mixed methods of password usage impacts the complexity levels of authentication 
methods. This impact comprises replacing PINs with forms of biometric identification that 
includes photos and fingerprints (De Angeli, Coutts, Coventry, Johnson, Cameron, & Fischer, 
2002; Dhamija, & Perrig, 2000). 
 
Resistance to Using Multi-Method Authentication Systems 
According to Coventry et al. (2003), multitudes of studies by National Cash Register (NCR) 
Self Service Strategic Solutions were conducted to gain a greater understanding of usability and 
user acceptance of advancing biometric verification methods. Their research was specifically 
related to verification technology at Automated Teller Machines (ATM) user interfaces. Their 
results indicated two elements affect how consumers perceive public technology and its benefits: 
(a) general attitudes viewed as to what consumers think, versus (b) realistic behaviors viewed as 
to what they actually do. While it appears that people have become more accepting of the use of 
facial and fingerprint technology for identification, there remains a level of mistrust due to a 
misunderstanding of biometrics or PIN functionality. These issues influencing consumers’ 
general confidence in biometric technology online is based on (a) little perceived usefulness of 
biometrics over PINs, (b) difficulty in accepting futuristic technology as dependable, regarding 
verification, and (c) potential for fraud through misinterpretation of voice, facial features, or 
fingerprints. Furthermore, research by NCR reported on by Coventry et al. (2003) indicated that 
refusal to use certain types of biometrics was based on perceived risks from (a) misuse of PII, (b) 
biometrics data collected, and (c) health concerns associated with iris verification. 
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According to Huixian and Liaojun (2009), the challenge of providing “privacy protection of 
biometric data has become a common concern of the public” (p. 295). Therefore, IOP is 
recognized as a significant influence over the degree of acceptance of biometric-based 
authentication. Biometric technologies come with an array of problems that are technical, as well 
as behavioral (Pons & Polak, 2008). These difficulties include data degradation and variances in 
data recorded. However, resistance to using is “based on attitudes and behaviors related to user 
acceptance, trust, habits, etc.” (p. 115). As a result of inconsistent attitudes relative to concerns 
over privacy, storage, protection, and the potential loss of PII, measuring user resistance is a 
challenging task. This can be attributed to users exhibiting fear, hesitancy, and discomfort over 
demands to change from current forms of authentication (Pons & Polak, 2008).  
Levy and Ramim (2009) conducted a study with a sample size of 100 non-IT students within 
the context of e-learning courses in a major university in the southeastern U.S. The study’s initial 
investigation was on the factors that might influence students’ use of multibiometric 
authentication during e-learning exams. The results of their study demonstrated that “students’ 
perceived ease-of-use is the second most significant predictor of students’ intention to use 
multibiometrics during e-learning exams” (p. 390).  Furthermore, their study identified the 
necessity to integrate a multibiometrics approach as current single factor biometric devices don’t 
provide the level of certainty for all authentication areas of need. Thus, this study followed the 
examples of Klaus, Wingreen, and Blanton (2010) as it measured individuals’ resistance to using 
multi-method authentication systems in public access environments, rather than their willingness 
to protect themselves from a perceived threat of PVOP, IOP, and AC due to breaches in identity 
theft.  
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Contributions of this Study 
In this chapter, a Conceptual Model was developed by expanding previously limited research 
of measuring resistance to multi-method authentication by searching the literature for current 
problems related to IDT and multi-method authentication systems (MMAS), as there appears to 
be a gap that needs to be filled. Topics were presented to advance the understanding of users’ 
awareness of the threat of the loss of PII due to IDT, the threat of IOP, and the significance of 
AC. Information gained from this study may lead to the development of methods of 
authentication for the protection of users’ PII. Therefore, additional research into user’s PVOP, 
IOP, AC, and its influence on RMS in public access environments might be warranted 
(Altinkemer, 2011; Furnell, 2005; Levy & Ramim, 2009; Nandakumar, 2008; Van Hoose, 2008).  
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
Research Design 
This study was a predictive study, which attempted to predict the dependent variable of 
individuals’ resistance to using multi-method authentication systems based on the contribution of 
the independent variables: PVOP, IOP, and AC (See Figure 1). This study used a survey as an 
instrument for the purpose of collecting data from participants. Multi-Linear Regression (MLR) 
was used to investigate the contribution of individuals’ PVOP, IOP, and AC to their resistance to 
using multi-method authentication systems in public-access environments. This study was 
empirical in nature, and collected quantitative data through the use of a Web-enabled survey 
instrument delivered to participants’ e-mail accounts. 
The three methods used in this study for multi-method authentication are fingerprint 
biometric recognition, a form of RFID referred to as "near field communication (NFC)," and 
password usage. According to Gottschalk (2010), industry trends are moving toward acceptance 
of fingerprint biometric recognition. Additionally, Gottschalk (2010) stated that RFID 
communication is a means of identifying a token or receiving device that is held on the person 
trying to gain access, or who is being tracked in an area of restriction. 
The main research question this study addressed was: What is the contribution of individuals’ 
perceptions of the importance of protecting their PII, noted as Perceived Value of Organizational 
Protection of PII (PVOP), Invasion of Privacy (IOP), Authentication Complexity (AC), and the 
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interaction on individuals’ resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (RMS) in 
public-access environments.  
In addressing the main RQ, this study uncovered 11 specific hypotheses (noted in null form): 
H1: Individuals’ Perceived Value of Organizational Protecting PII (PVOP) will have no 
statistically significant influence on individuals’ resistance to using a multi-method 
authentication system (RMS) in public-access environments. 
H2: Invasion of Privacy (IOP) will have no statistically significant influence on individuals’ 
resistance to using a multi-method authentication system (RMS) in public-access 
environments. 
H3: Authentication Complexity (AC) will have no statistically significant influence on 
individuals’ resistance to using a multi-method authentication system (RMS) in public-
access environments. 
H4: There will be no significant interaction effect of PVOP, IOP, and AC on individuals’ 
resistance to using a multi-method authentication system (RMS) in public-access 
environments. 
H5a: PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS will have no statistically significant difference based on age 
(AGE). 
H5b: PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS will have no statistically significant difference based on gender 
(GEN). 
H5c: PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS will have no statistically significant difference based on 
person’s degree major (DM). 
H5d: PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS will have no statistically significant difference based on 
academic level (AL). 
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H5e: PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS will have no statistically significant difference based on 
person’s prior experience with identity theft (EXP). 
H5f: PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS will have no statistically significant difference based on person’s 
acquaintance experience with identity theft (EXA). 
H6: There will be no statistically significant differences on PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS based on 
individuals who have used a multi-method authentication system and those who have not, as 
well as student and faculty in public-access environments. 
Table 1. Summary Table of Authors and Constructs 
Constructs Sources 
Personal Value of Organizational 
Protection Personal Identifying 
Information (PVOP) 
Nosko, Wood, & Molema, 2010 
Furnell, Tsaganidi, & Phippen, 2008 
Invasion of Privacy (IOP) Furnell & Clarke, 2012 
Furnell, Bryant, & Phippen, 2007 
Authentication Complexity (AC) Furnell, Papadaki, Illingworth, & 
Reynolds, 2004 
Gunson, Marshall, McInnes, & Jack, 2011 
Resistance to Using Multi-Method 
Authentication Systems in Public Access 
Environments (EXA) 
Coventry, De Angeli, & Johnson, 2003 
Levy & Ramim, 2009 
 
A survey instrument was created based on validated literature to address the specific research 
questions and hypotheses noted above. The following sections address these relevant steps and 
issues: 1) survey instrument creation; 2) reliability and validity issues; 3) identifying the 
population and sample procedures to be used; 4) conducting a pre-analysis data screening; as 
well as 5) theoretical model testing. 
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Instrument Development 
Prior literature indicated that it is more advantageous to use previously established measures 
in IS research than to create new ones (Leidner & Jarvenpaa, 1995). Furthermore, Moore and 
Benbesat (1991) presented prior research that was recognized as having reliability and validity 
for development of new research. As a result, this study developed a survey instrument that uses 
survey items from previous valid research conducted by Cicchetti, Showalter, and Tyrer (1985), 
Compeau and Higgins (1995), Heissen, (1987), as well as Igbaria and Iivari (1998). Additionally, 
Likert-type scale response anchors were utilized as identified by Vagias (2006). 
The results of the study by Cicchetti et al. (1985) indicated that: (a) the level of joint-probability 
of agreement exhibited the lowest based on only two categories; (b) reliability reflected increases 
in relation to the number of categories used; as well as (c) the level of seven indicated the most 
reliable results, with any contribution above seven being insignificant. Additionally, Verplanken 
and Orbell (2003) originally conducted four separate studies. They used a seven-point Likert 
scale for Studies One and Two, while using an 11-point Likert scale for Studies Three and Four. 
Nevertheless, Miller (1956, p. 4) noted that “psychologists have been using seven-point rating 
scales for a long time, on the intuitive basis that trying to rate into finer categories does not really 
add much to the usefulness of the ratings.” Lewis (1993) found that 7-point scales resulted in 
stronger correlations with t-test results.  
A review of valid literature was conducted to select the survey items for measuring PVOP in 
public access environments. This study followed the studies of Shareef and Kumar (2012) that 
addressed the issue of identity theft in the use of global and internal measures to address the theft 
of PII. Some of the internal measures included authentication and address verification 
technology software techniques (Shareef & Kumar, 2012). As the research is limited for PVOP, 
38 
 
 
 
IOP, and AC against resistance, the questions were reviewed for validation by the expert panel. 
The Likert scale has categories measuring participant responses from ‘1’ - “not important” to ‘7’ 
- “highly important” (Cicchetti et al., 1985; Vagias, 2006). The specific items numbered PVOP1 
– PVOP10 are provided in Appendix A.  
A review of literature was conducted to select the survey items to measure IOP in public 
access environments. Furnell (2008) developed a list of items as pre- and post- workshop surveys 
that queried students regarding their IOP. A similar list was suggested by Anderson, Durbin, 
and Salinger (2008), as well as Furnell (2007). The survey items selected were those that are 
commonly identified as contributing to increased identity theft (Anderson et al., 2008; Furnell et 
al., 2007). This study followed the studies of Furnell et al. (2007) to measure IOP. The Likert 
scale has categories measuring participant responses from ‘1’ - “Strongly Disagree” to ‘7’ - 
“Strongly Agree” (Cicchetti et al., 1985; Vagias, 2006). The specific items numbered IOP1 – 
IOP6 are provided in Appendix A.  
A review of valid literature was conducted to select the survey items to measure AC in public 
access environments. This study followed the example of Weir et al. (2009), Gunson et al. 
(2010), and Gunson et al. (2011) to measure users’ AC within public access environments. This 
study followed the study of Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, G., and Davis, F. (2003) to measure AC. 
The Likert scale has categories measuring participant responses from ‘1’ - “Strongly Disagree” 
to ‘7’ - “Strongly Agree” (Cicchetti et al., 1985; Vagias, 2006). The specific items numbered 
AC1 – AC6 are provided in Appendix A.  
An investigation into the relationship between user resistance and mandatory user technology 
requirements within large scale enterprise systems (ES) was conducted by Klaus, Wingreen, and 
Blanton (2010). Their study consisted of 186 companies that had implemented an ES against 
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which little was known of user resistance. Additionally, user resistance was identified as the 
second highest cost factor related to cost overruns, and the highest barrier to implementation 
(Cooke & Peterson, 1998). This study followed the studies of Paine, Reips, Stieger, Joinson, and 
Buchanan (2007); Cases, Fournier, Dubois, and Tanner (2010), as well as Klaus, Wingreen, and 
Blanton (2010) to measure RMS. The Likert scale has categories measuring participant 
responses from ‘1’ - “Strongly Disagree” to ‘7’ - “Strongly Agree” (Cicchetti et al., 1985). RMS 
is using seven items RMS1 to RMS7 as provided in Appendix A. Those scales are (1) strongly 
disagree, (2) disagree, (3) somewhat disagree, (4) neither disagree nor agree, (5) somewhat 
agree, (6) agree, and (7) strongly agree.  
Straub (1989) stated that different methods of establishing content validity should include 
literature reviews and expert panels. Furthermore, Sekaran (2003) indicated that content validity 
“establishes the representative sampling of a whole set of items that measures a concept, and 
reflects how well the dimensions and elements of the concept have been delineated” (p. 364). 
The three independent variables, PVOP, IOP, and AC, as well as RMS, the dependent variable, 
were developed through a review of valid literature. Nevertheless, the variables on the survey 
instrument have yet to be validated in the context of RMS in public access environments. 
Therefore, an expert panel was formed to safeguard content validity. The expert panel consisted 
of terminally degreed experts in the IS field. An anonymous survey was presented to the expert 
panel members, who were given two weeks to review and comment on the content of the 
different variables. Once the panel submitted its recommendations, any suggested changes were 
addressed; the items were resubmitted to the panel for final review and consensus. 
A pilot study was conducted, using a small sample of 15 to 25 users including students and 
instructors, to strengthen the overall instrument validity. According to Trochim and Donnelly 
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(2008), “measures, samples, and designs don’t have validity—only propositions can be said to be 
valid (p. 20). Therefore, a measure is what leads to valid conclusions or inferences. Thus, it is a 
proposition, inference, or conclusion which can have validity” (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). 
According to Sekaran (2003), the “reliability of a measure is an indication of the stability and 
consistency with which the instrument measures the concept and helps to assess the 'goodness' of 
a measure” (p. 203). As a result, construct validity affirms “how well the results obtained from 
the use of the measure fit the theories around which the test is designed” (Sekaran, 2003, p. 207).  
Following the example of Venkatesh and Morris (2000), as well as Albirini (2006), this study 
collected the following demographic information from individuals in the sample groups: age, 
gender, degree major, academic level, prior personal experience with identity theft, and 
acquaintance experience with identity theft. This information ensured the data collected was 
representative of the population.  
 
Validity and Reliability 
Validity can be defined “as the best available approximation to the truth of a given 
proposition, inference, or conclusion” (Donnelly & Trochim, 2008, p. 20). Three traditional 
types of validity are (1) content, (2) criterion-related, such as predictive or concurrent, and (3) 
construct (Creswell, 2003; Sekaran, 2003). Additionally, validity provides “evidence that the 
instrument, technique, or process used to measure a concept does indeed measure the intended 
concept” (Sekaran, 2003, p. 425). Validity is a reflection of the depth of accuracy by which a 
survey measures the intended item and permits interpretation of the participant scores (Gay, 
1996; Litwin, 1995). According to Boudreau, Gefen, and Straub (2004), unbiased observers of a 
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study consider the prerequisites of relevance and measurability mandatory for obtaining 
trustworthiness.  
Internal validity refers to “whether the observed effects could have been caused by or 
correlated with a set of unhypothesized and/or unmeasured variables” (Straub, 1989, p. 151). 
Additionally, internal validity is reflective of the trustworthiness or authenticity of the cause-and-
effect relationships between two different variables (Sekaran, 2003). According to Creswell 
(2003), internal validity threats are “experimental procedures, treatments, or experiences of the 
participants that threaten the researcher’s ability to draw correct inferences from the data in an 
experiment” (p. 170). This study addressed the research questions using developed measures that 
have been validated in previous research, along with anonymous measures of individuals’ 
personal experiences and demographics.  
External validity refers to the generalizability of results in various field settings that becomes 
transferable to entire organizations (Sekaran, 2003). Additionally, external validity refers to the 
approximate truth of conclusions that involve the generalizability of conclusions for other 
persons, places, and times (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). One 
aspect of generalizability, referred to as "proximal similarity," denotes the consideration of 
differing contexts that are more or less like one's own study (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). The 
utilization of random selection and proximal similarity by means of “providing data about the 
degree of similarity between various groups, places and even times” could significantly enhance 
generalizability (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008, p. 36). The generalizability of this study was 
focused on similar organizations, as the individuals in the sample group were expected to 
number approximately 250, or 40% of the student body, from a small, private university from a 
single geographic location in the southwestern United States. In addition, individuals with 
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minimal computer experience may have difficulty using the authentication technology 
equipment, or resist using the equipment, due to the nature of the technology. Therefore, these 
factors may reduce the generalizability of the results to other public-access environments and 
contexts not included in this study sample.   
Reliability is defined as the extent to which constructs are free from error, as well as yield 
results over a specific, consistent time-frame that represent the total population being studied, 
and to which extent the final results are reproducible under similar methodology (Joppe, 2000; 
Leedy & Ormrod, 2001; Straub, 1989). Cronbach (1951) developed the measurement, known as 
Cronbach’s Alpha, to establish a means of measuring the internal consistency of a test or scale, 
with values ranging between 0 and 1.0. The values of .60 to .70 are considered the lower levels 
of acceptable reliability among the indicators (Geffen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000). However, 
Sprinthall (1997) indicated that reliability values above .70 were preferred. Sekaran (2003) 
identified Cronbach’s Alpha as “a reliability coefficient that indicates how well the items in a set 
are positively correlated to one another” (p. 207). Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (1984) 
indicated that Cronbach’s Alpha is the most commonly used measure of reliability for a set of 
two or more indicators for constructs. According to Leedy and Ormrod (2001), case studies are 
required to have a specifically defined time-frame. Furthermore, Kirk and Miller (1986) 
identified three types of reliability referred to in quantitative research as (1) the extent to which a 
repeated measurement remains consistent, (2) the stability of a measurement over a specific 
time-frame, and (3) the similarity of measurements within a specified timeframe. Tavakol and 
Dennick (2011) defined internal consistency as a means by which all items within a construct are 
measured by the same concept, and are inter-linked with each other. Therefore, reliability could 
be considered the correlation of a construct with its items (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). Each 
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construct was measured individually to determine reliability with a Cronbach’s Alpha analysis 
(Levy, 2006; Sprinthall, 1997). 
  
Population and Sample 
The sample population in this study were individuals at a small, private university in the 
southwestern U.S. While the total sample population of participants was approximately 600-700 
individuals, participation was expected to be approximately 250 individuals for the research 
study. The makeup of the student body is approximately 34 years of age with 60% female versus 
40% male students. Students attend most classes in the evenings and are considered non-
traditional. The breakdown of the sample is such that the control group and the experimental 
group would each have approximately 125 individuals, reflecting differing degree majors, as 
well as academic levels. The sample group was further divided by the identifying of each of the 
participants. The surveys labeled as a) faculty-username/password and c) student-
username/password comprised the experimental group. The surveys labeled as b) faculty-
multimethod authentication system and d) student- multimethod authentication system 
comprised the control group. The majority of students are employed and are attempting to further 
their skill levels, position advancement, as well as, employability through an accredited college. 
The experimental group received a video training before entering the computer lab. Upon 
entering, the experimental group received an updated student proximity ID card with RFID 
technology and provided a fingerprint template. Upon completion of these steps, they were 
instructed on how to complete the online survey.  The control group was instructed to use their 
pre-existing method of username and password to complete the survey. The control group 
authentication method was more related to the concerns of users forgetting their passwords, 
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improper entries, and being locked out occasionally. Password risks are universally recognized 
patterns that are used in many environments based on all participants using the same identical 
data for recognition. After completion of the survey, the students received training in the use of 
the multi-method authentication system based on RFID and biometric identification. The 
experimental group differed in that they received training in the use of the multi-method 
authentication system first and then completed the survey. Participants were presented with the 
biometric and RFID device information through an introductory training class presented to them 
prior to taking the survey. The participants were tested on their abilities with the specific 
emerging biometric technology for use in e-commerce authentication in public-access 
environments. Contact was made with all instructors informing them of the purpose and 
importance of the survey/study as it relates to their students. Once the survey and study were 
prepared for deployment, a follow-up visit was made to each instructor to answer any questions 
and determine if assistance was needed prior to the actual data collection being conducted. The 
emerging fingerprint biometric and RFID technology that provided the basis for this study were 
the primary technologies explored.  
An online survey instrument was provided through a Web link on each participant's computer 
provided for the study. The results were tabulated through the Web-based survey instrument. The 
response data was collected and validated on a centralized system and was safeguarded for 
accuracy, preventing any alterations of the results. 
 
Pre-Analysis Data Screening 
According to Levy (2006), pre-analysis data screening is of critical importance for 
maintaining accuracy, assuring consistency in or completeness of responses, looking for missing 
45 
 
 
 
data, and screening for the extreme multivariate outliers. Thus, the four identified reasons for 
pre-analysis data screening were: (1) correctness of the data collected, (2) response-set issues, (3) 
recognizing missing data, and (4) existence of outliers. In this study, the collected survey data 
was exported to the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences® (SPSS) Statistics 22.0 (SPSS, 
n.d.) for analysis, after screening for the four areas of critical importance listed above (Mertler & 
Vannatta, 2010).  
The first reason for pre-analysis data screening is to be certain that the accuracy of data 
collected doesn’t improperly influence validity results (Mertler & Vanatta, 2010; Tabachnich & 
Fidell, 1996). To ensure an accurate data collection process that prevents invalid data results, a 
Web-based survey instrument was utilized for data collection. This assisted in eliminating errors 
that might occur through manual data entry of the collected data results; however, additional visual 
observation of the data was done to ensure data accuracy during the data collection and prevent any 
data submission and/or Web-based survey instrument errors.  
The second reason for pre-analysis data screening is response-set concerns where 
participants provide the identical answer to all questions on a measureable survey instrument 
(Levy, 2006). According to Gurwitz (1987), the inclination for participants to provide answers 
to a survey instrument based on their particular frame of thinking, rather than the actual question 
being presented, is viewed as a potential response-set worry. Of particular concern is the event 
where a participant has answered all or nearly all questions with the same score without reading 
the questions. To address this response-set concern, the study conducted an analysis to consider 
any response-set removal prior to final analysis.  
The third reason for pre-analysis data screening is to avoid the incidence of missing 
incomplete data that can occur during response times of a survey instrument (Schafer & Olsen, 
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1998). These can occur when participants “may be unwilling or unable to respond to some items 
or may fail to complete sections of a [survey instrument] due to lack of time or interest,” (Schafer 
& Olsen, 1998, p. 545). However, the impact of trying to accommodate these occurrences by 
deleting or minimizing their contribution to the results can lead to other unpredictable results, 
thus, influencing outcomes (Hertel, 1976). To minimize this potential problem, the survey 
instrument needed to be concise with an established completion time-frame during which all 
questions were to be completed prior to submission. This procedure ensured that all surveys were 
submitted without missing data. However, the data was observed prior to full analysis to ensure 
there were no missing data. 
The last reason identified by Levy (2006) for pre-analysis data screening is the potential for 
distortion due to extreme cases, also known as outliers. Hodge and Austin (2004) defined an 
outlier as a participant answer or observation that has deviated notably from what is viewed as 
the norm of others surveyed. The use of accepted research tools for recognizing outliers is 
essential to eliminating potential data set corruptors that may threaten validity (Penny, 1996). 
One such tool for detecting outliers is the Mahalanobis Distance, which was used on the data 
collected to test for multivariate outliers. Cases that were recognized as multivariate outliers were 
closely investigated for potential removal prior to further analyses.   
 
Data Analysis 
The main research question that this study addressed is: What is the contribution of PVOP, 
IOP, AC, and their interaction on individual resistance to using multi-method authentication 
systems in public access environments? To understand further the relative significance of the 
contribution of the three independent variables (PVOP, IOP, & AC) and their interaction in 
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predicting RMS in public access environments, a multiple linear regression (MLR) analysis was 
conducted. 
According to Mertler and Vannatta (2010), three statistical tests are used to address the degree 
of relationship between variables. The three tests are Bivariate Correlation and Regression, 
Multiple Regression, and Path Analysis. Of these, “Multiple Regression identifies the best 
combination of predictors (IVs) of the dependent variable” (Mertler & Vanatta, 2010, p. 14). The 
factors that determine which test to apply to this research were based on the number of 
independent variables, the categories of the independent variable, and dependent variables 
(Mertler & Vannatta, 2010). This study used MLR to analyze hypotheses H1 through H4 to 
determine if a causal relationship exists between users’ PVOP, IOP, AC, and their interaction on 
RMS. Additionally, a multivariate analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used to analyze 
hypotheses H5a-H5f to determine if a causal relationship exists between users’ PVOP, IOP, AC 
on RMS when holding the control variables constant (i.e. covariates). The Hypothesis H6 used a t-
test to determine if a significant difference existed on the measures of users’ PVOP, IOP, AC, and 
RMS based on individuals who have used a multi-method authentication system in public-access 
environments and those who haven’t, as well as the comparisons between student and faculty.  
After the pre-analysis data screening, reliability, and validity tests were completed, further 
statistical analyses were performed. The effects of the independent variables on the dependent 
variables were investigated by using the MLR model. According to Chen and Hughes (2004), 
MLR used independent variables to predict the probability of the dependent variable using a linear 
approach. Thus, MLR was an appropriate starting approach for measuring the effect of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable in this study (Chen & Hughes, 2004). 
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According to Sekaran (2003), MLR analysis is defined as “a statistical technique to predict 
the variance in the dependent variable by testing the independent variables against it” (p. 420). 
The coefficient significance level was measured to determine whether any of the independent 
variables were significant. Therefore, the MLR equation for this study consists of three 
independent variables, one interaction, and one dependent variable. The MLR was completed for 
each group separately with the same questions being presented to each group. The hypotheses for 
PVOP, IOP, and AC reflected different responses for those not having been trained first, versus 
those who received training prior to using the multi-method authentication and then completed 
the survey. This may indicate that prior training could convince individuals to use the multi-
method authentication system.  
This study examined a model to test the contribution of three independent variables: PVOP, 
IOP, and AC, along with their interaction to the dependent variable: RMS. The study followed 
the example of others (Brady, 2010; Perez, 2013) and used regression analysis to test the strength 
of the prediction model. According to Mertler and Vannatta (2010), “multiple regression 
identifies the best combination of predictors (IVs) of the dependent variable” (p. 14).  
For MLR, there is a need to aggregate the items within each construct. With a respect to 
RMS, data aggregation for the purpose of the analyses will be done using a linear summation of 
the items assessed. The following will represent the data aggregation for the constructs 
measured: 
(Eq. 1) RMS = RMS1+RMS2+...+RMS7 
(Eq. 2) PVOP = PVOP1+....PVOP10 
(Eq. 3) IOP = IOP1+IOP2+...+IOP6 
(Eq. 4) AC = AC1+AC2+....+AC6  
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MLR will investigate the significance and magnitude of the weights (w1, w2, & w3) 
(Eq. 5) RMS = w1*PVOP+w2*IOP+w3*AC + constant 
 
The results from the data analyses are presented in various tables and figures in the results 
section of the next chapter. Conclusions were derived from the data reported in the tables and 
figures and summarized accordingly. The MLR analyses were used to examine the 
significance of the contribution of the independent variables and their interaction on the 
dependent variable, and then the results were presented. 
 
Resources Requirements 
To conduct the survey, the following resources will be required: 
1. NSU dissertation advisor and committee 
2. NSU IRB advisor 
3. WBU Vice President of External Campuses 
4. WBU Dean and Executive Director of Wayland Baptist University-Lubbock  
5. WBU expert panel 
6. MMAS biometric and smart card readers 
Additional testing resources required for this study included biometric fingerprint devices 
and USB-installed radio frequency identification (RFID) devices for authentication recognition. 
The devices required software to be installed on each of the test units. The testing labs were 
isolated computer labs reserved for special activities, to prevent any potential misuse or 
interference during the testing phase. Access to the participants was managed through the 
university’s communication system. A survey instrument was created for participant use. All 
required hardware and software resources were installed for the experiment. To ensure the 
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validity of the testing devices' accuracy and effectiveness, the devices received the required 
approval from the university. The Web-based survey conducted through the use of the electronic 
survey software, Google Docs™, undertook pre-analysis, and was analyzed for all statistical 
techniques using SPSS. The NSU’s digital library resources were used throughout this 
investigation (NSU Libraries, n.d.).  
 
Summary 
Chapter three provided the description of the methodology, the research design, and the four 
survey instruments with their various measures used in this study. This study sought to measure 
participants’ differences in how they valued their organizational protection of personal 
identifying information, the invasion of their privacy, their level of importance placed on 
authentication complexity, and how these variables interacted with their level of resistance to 
using multi-method authentication measures. The developed survey instruments are listed in 
Appendix A-D of this dissertation. Addressed in this chapter were both internal and external 
validity and any related issues that required resolution. An expert panel was established to 
address potential issues such as the scale level and validity of questions, prior to being placed 
within the Web-based survey (Straub, 1989). Furthermore, the measure of Cronbach’s Alpha is 
necessary to ensure reliability (Sekaran, 2003).  
This study addressed issues with reliability associated with raw data being inaccurate, 
response-set, missing data, and outliers. Furthermore, collinearity, correlation, and covariate 
reports were examined. The data was analyzed using descriptive statistics for the means and 
standard deviations. Further, ANCOVA tests for means checked the data for statistical 
significant differences between the experimental and control groups that represented the four 
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different survey groups. The surveys labeled as (a) faculty-username/password and (c) student-
username/password comprised the experimental group. The surveys labeled as (b) faculty-
multimethod authentication system and (d) student- multimethod authentication system 
comprised the control group. Lastly, resources required for the study were provided.  
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Chapter 4 
Results 
 
Overview 
This chapter outlines results of the data analysis for this empirical study. The outcome of the 
three independent variables, Perceived Value of Organizational Protection of Personal 
Identifying Information (PVOP), Invasion of Privacy (IOP), and Authentication Complexity 
(AC), on the singular dependent variable, Resistance to Using Multi-Method Authentication 
System (RMS), were explored. The results for this study were accomplished in four phases.  
Phase I: Exploratory Research, details the development of the four Web-based survey 
instruments by conducting a thorough literature review based on topics related to constructs in 
the field of IS related to PII, IOP, AC, identity theft, trust, and resistance to technology usage 
(Nosko, Wood, & Molema, 2010; Furnell, Papadaki, Illingworth, & Reynolds, 2004). Phase II, 
the Delphi Method, was used to present the developed instrument to the assembled expert panel 
for their feedback and adjustments. The Delphi Method employs the use of a multi-iterative 
approach to construct a consensus forecast based on the key assumption that recommendations 
from a group of experts that for increased internal validity of the instrument (Okoli & 
Pawlowski, 2004). Phase III, Pre-Survey Training, details the correct survey selection, training 
video participation, biometric data collection, and survey instruction. Phase IV, Quantitative 
Research, specifies the data collection and analysis methods followed. The pre-analysis data 
screening inspected the results of survey data for accuracy, response-sets, missing data, and 
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outliers (Ellis & Levy, 2003). Finally, the descriptive statistics examined the data analysis results 
for PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS. The Cronbach alpha reliability test, the ANCOVA tests for the 
covariates, the significance test for differences on the demographic variables, and the t-tests were 
used to report results.   
 
Phase I: Exploratory Research 
Phase I: Exploratory Research, details the development of the Web-based survey instruments 
based on existing measures in order to collect data for this study. An extensive literature review 
was conducted in the IS and Web-based systems literature in order to identify the most prevalent 
issues related to research of multi-method authentication systems. along with the demographic 
variables that are associated with the potential resistance constructs to such systems. The survey 
instrument was developed with peer-reviewed journal articles identified as relevant to the topics 
to be explored from prior studies as listed in Table 1. The demographic variables reflected on the 
survey instruments were selected based on prior studies related to authentication systems 
research, which include: age, gender, degree major, academic level, no privacy intrusion, no 
acquaintance privacy intrusion based on IDT, and password misuse (Coventry, De Angli, & 
Johnson, 2003; Furnell & Clarke, 2012; Levy & Ramim, 2009; Nosko, Wood, & Molema, 2010). 
The survey instrument was specifically designed to be used with Google Docs©, a Web-based 
survey tool. 
 
Phase II: Delphi Method  
Phase II: the Delphi Method, detail the gathering of the expert panel for pre-screening of the 
preliminary Web-based survey instrument. The expert panel examined the layout, strength of 
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questions, Likert scale to be used, and validity of the instruments as a whole. The Delphi expert 
panel consisted of six experts from the IS, mathematics, education, and online-learning fields 
listed in Table 2. 
Table 2. Delphi Panel Experts 
Area of Expertise Number of Experts 
Information Systems 3 
Mathematics 
Education 
1 
1 
Online-Learning 1 
 
Feedback was collected from the expert panel, appraised, and integrated into the survey 
instruments after a final review was completed. This process increased the validity of the survey 
instruments in order to ensure a valid response to the measures. Table 3 reflects feedback 
provided by the expert panel and related adjustments that were made to the survey instrument 
after the first cycle. The Delphi expert panel method of consensus was unanimous resulting in no 
further changes after the first cycle. 
Table 3. Adjustments to the Survey Instrument Recommended by the Delphi Expert Panel 
Change # Feedback Adjustments 
1. Use of a five-point scale Seven-point Likert scale was used for preciseness 
 
2. Addition of a question 
related to refusing to use 
MMAS unless mandatory 
 
A question was added to the survey related to a 
mandatory requirement of MMAS  
3. Deletion of repetitive 
questions 
Questions were examined and deleted as 
appropriate 
 
Phase III: Pre-Survey Selection and Training  
Phase III: Pre-Survey Selection and Training began with the distribution of an email inviting 
recipients to participate in the Web-based survey. The invitation was disseminated to more than 
650 students and faculty members. A follow-up email was sent two weeks later. Of the 650 
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invitations to participate, 206 participants responded, representing a 33% response rate. Each 
participant was randomly assigned to a group; and each group was directed to the appropriate 
testing area. The four groups identified were Faculty/MMAS and Student/MMAS, or, 
Faculty/Username+Password and Student/Username+Password. Only the groups identified as 
MMAS viewed an instructional video before taking the survey. All other participants conducted 
the survey in a separate classroom without MMAS equipment or training. After MMAS 
participants completed the video training, their personal biometric and smart card with RFID 
technology recognition data was configured. 
  
Phase IV: Quantitative Research 
Pre-analysis Data Screening 
Phase IV: Quantitative Research, introduced the pre-analysis data screening. All questions 
were required to be answered prior to submitting the completed survey, thereby alleviating the 
possibility of missing data. None of the questions were open-ended; and the available responses 
were based on a seven-point Likert-scale. Since selections for each variable were made from a 
preset scale of values, data accuracy was ensured. Responses to each of the 29 questions were 
downloaded to an Excel spreadsheet before loading it to SPSS for further analyses. 
After exporting the data, the data set was analyzed for any response-set issues reflecting 
submitted answers being the same. This occurs when any participants select the same scale value 
to all the construct items being assessed (Levy & Ramim, 2009). After a visual inspection, no 
cases were removed, thereby representing a 100% acceptance level of the response-set answers, 
and leaving 206 useful cases for further analyses. However, to ensure the accuracy of the data, 
the minimum and maximum values for each item was inspected for responses within the 
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expected value ranges and to ensure the values were not invalidated during the transfer of data 
between Google Docs and SPSS. All responses were within the acceptable ranges.  
The final step for pre-analysis data screening was to identify multivariate outliers by 
completing a Mahalanobis Distance analysis within SPSS on the survey items of all independent 
variables. A 95% confidence level was used in order to identify multivariate outliers. These 
outliers represent patterns of scores that are extreme or irregular in comparison to others. One 
outlier case was removed from the data set due to Mahalanobis Distance analysis, leaving a total 
of 205 useful cases available for additional data analyses. Next, the bell-shaped frequency 
distribution histogram analysis of the variables was performed to provide evidence that the 
variables PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS were normally distributed. The analysis found the 
distribution as linear and distributed, further provide validity for the use of MLR in this case.  
In order to demonstrate homogeneity of variance of the dependent variable, a scatter plot 
analysis was performed visually using a matrix of scatter plots of the residuals versus the 
predicted values. The residuals were randomly and relatively evenly scattered on either side of 
their mean (zero) value with respect to the predicted values. This result reflected homogeneity of 
variance of the dependent variable. MLR analysis also assumes that the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables is linear as reflected in the regression analysis; however, 
this is not always predictable. This linearity can be an upward or downward slope. Linearity 
implies that the average change in the dependent variable associated with a unit change in the 
independent variable is constant. In viewing the matrix of the scatter plot, PVOP presents an 
inversely related linearity in relation to IOP, AC, and RMS. 
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Descriptive Statistics Data Analysis 
To measure the effect of the independent variables, PVOP, IOP, AC, on the dependent 
variable, RMS, descriptive statistics were used to calculate the means and standard deviations. 
Descriptive statistics analysis was used to predict the values of normally distributed dependent 
variables with a correlation to one or more independent variables (Chen & Hughes, 2004; 
Tabachnik & Fidel, 2007). In this investigation, the residuals, represented by the differences 
between the predicted and the observed values, were normally distributed (Table 4). The mean 
values of the independent variables IOP, AC, and the dependent variable, RMS, were between 
3.003 to 3.450 indicating a general tendency for the numerically-coded responses to represent a 
value somewhere between “somewhat disagree to agree” with the items (score = 3) and “neither 
disagree nor agree” with the items (score = 4). Additionally, the mean value of the independent 
variable, PVOP, was 6.586 indicating a general tendency for the numerically-coded responses to 
represent a value somewhere between “very important” with the items (score = 6) and “highly 
important” with the items (score = 7). The standard deviations of all of the variables ranged from 
.769 to 1.134, indicating a relatively controlled variability in the responses.  
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics (Means and Standard Deviations) (N=205) 
 PVOP IOP AC RMS 
Mean 6.586 3.056 3.450 3.003 
Standard Deviation .769 1.103 .981 1.134 
 
Tabachnik and Fidell (2007) indicated that collinearity is the inter-correlation between the 
predicting variables in an MLR model. Therefore, when the inter-correlation is excessive, the 
standard errors are inflated. This influences the signs and the magnitudes of the regression 
coefficients. According to Tabachnik and Fidell (2007), this inhibits accurately assessing the 
relative importance of each of the predicting variables. Collinearity presents a significant 
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problem when the research methodology is designed to predict the effect of the independent 
variables on the dependent variable. As demonstrated by O’Brien (2007), evaluating the 
possibility of excessive collinearity is dependent on the necessity of the researcher’s level of 
rigor. Descriptive statistics did not violate the statistical assumptions of MLR with respect to 
collinearity as presented in Table 5. 
Table 5. Collinearity Statistics to Predict RMS 
 
Model Dimension 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) PVOP IOP AC 
1 1 .00 .00 .01 .00 
2 .01 .02 .91 .07 
3 .02 .06 .00 .87 
4 .97 .93 .08 .05 
a. Dependent Variable: RMS 
 
The Pearson correlation analysis calculates the potential of excessive collinearity (Tabachnik 
& Fidell, 2007). When the correlation coefficient matrix includes correlations of approximately 
0.7 or higher, excessive collinearity may exist (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). A second method to 
evaluate the effect of excessive collinearity is to calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
statistic (O’Brien, 2007). Although VIF values are always greater than or equal to 1, the literature 
does not specify how large VIF values should be to impact a dependent variable. According to 
O’Brien (2007), there are differences between researchers reporting that VIF values over 2.5 
indicate excessive collinearity, while other researchers would disagree and apply more lenient 
VIF cut-offs of 4.0 or higher for excessive collinearity.  
To ensure that excessive collinearity did not compromise the results, the VIF cut-off value used 
in this investigation was 2.5 as prescribed by Alison (1998). According to the Pearson’s 
correlation of coefficients analysis in Table 6, no variables expressed high levels of collinearity 
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at approximately 0.7 or higher. Furthermore, all the variables were examined for collinearity and 
identified as exhibiting values of p < .01, thus, completing the testing of the fitness of the 
experimental variables. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a statistically significant 
correlation between PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS as confirmed by the matrix of Pearson 
correlation of coefficients. Based on the results of the p values from .000 to .003 indicating 
significance, the null hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H5 (a-d, f), and H6 (a-b) were rejected. The null 
hypotheses H4 and H5e were not rejected as listed in Table 6. 
Table 6.  Matrix of Pearson Correlation of Coefficients (N=205) 
 PVOP IOP AC RMS  
PVOP Pearson Correlation 1 -.165* -.053 -.280  
Sig. (2-tailed)- PVOP  .018 .449 .000 *** 
IOP Pearson Correlation -.165* 1 .173* .208  
Sig. (2-tailed)-IOP .018  .013 .003 ** 
AC Pearson Correlation -.053 .173* 1 .455**  
Sig. (2-tailed)-AC .449 .013  .000 *** 
RMS Pearson Correlation -.280** .208** .455** 1  
Sig. (2-tailed)-RMS .000 .003 .000   
* - p < 0.05, ** - p < 0.01, *** - p < 0.001 
 
Cronbach’s α reliability tests were computed to determine the internal consistency for the 
survey items PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS. The final analysis resulted in acceptable reliability 
scores for each variable according to Cronbach’s α value of .70 (Sprinthall, 1997). The 
remaining internal consistency in order was PVOP (a = .960), IOP (a = .674), AC (a = .752), 
and RMS (a = .847) respectfully. The reliability analysis results for the survey items are 
presented in Table 7.  
Table 7. Cronbach Reliability Analysis (N=205) 
Variable Number of Items Cronbach’s a 
PVOP 10 .960 
IOP 6 .674 
AC 6 .752 
RMS 7 .847 
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The MLR model used in this investigation was:  
RMS = β0 + βPVOP*PVOP + βIOP*IOP + βAC*AC  
where β0 represents the theoretical predicted value or the intercept of the dependent variable 
when all the independent variables are zero; and βPVOP, βIOP, and βAC represent the standardized 
partial regression coefficients for the independent variables. The descriptive statistics analysis 
calculated by SPSS to predict RMS using standardized coefficients derived from the mean 
average of the collected survey data is reflected in Table 8. 
RMS = 3.356 - .356*PVOP + .097*IOP + .492*AC 
The value of p > .05 that was used to evaluate the t statistics indicated that the intercept was not 
zero, and that RMS increased in value with respect to IOP, and AC. The value of p > .05 used to 
evaluate the t statistics indicated that the MLR coefficients for IOP were not important indicators 
of RMS and RMS did not increase significantly with respect to IOP as presented in Table 7. 
Table 8. MLR Coefficients to Predict RMS 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error 
1 (Constant) 3.356 .689 4.872 .000 *** 
PVOP  -.356 .089 -3.990 .000 *** 
IOP   .097 .063 1.536 .126  
AC    .492 .070 7.015 .000 *** 
* - p < 0.05, ** - p < 0.01, *** - p < 0.001 
 
The adjusted R˄2 = .271 presented in Table 9 indicates that the MLR model predicted a 
moderate proportion of the variance in RMS. 
Table 9. Adjusted R^2 and Standard Error to Predict RMS 
Model R R˄2 Adjusted R˄2 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .530a .281 .271 .96859 
a. Predictors: (Constant), AC, PVOP, IOP  
b. Dependent Variable: RMS 
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Table 10 indicates that there is no significant interaction between PVOP, IOP, and AC on 
RMS. The results indicate an acceptance of the hypothesis H4.  
Table 10. ANOVA Interaction Results for PVOP, IOP, AC based on RMS  
  df F Sig.  
PVOP * IOP * AC Between 
Groups 
Within Groups 
190 
203 
1.553 .174  
No significant differences were observed based on RMS, F(df=190)=1.553, p=0.174  
RMS = Dependent Variable 
* - p < 0.05, ** - p < 0.01, *** - p < 0.001 
 
Demographic Data Analysis 
Demographic data related to the variables of age, gender, degree major, academic level, 
participants’ prior experience with identity theft, and participants’ acquaintance experience with 
identity theft was collected from the 205 participants. The ages of most of the participants were 
between 19 and 49 accounting for 90% of the sample. The demographic analysis conducted in 
SPSS included a frequency distribution and percentage rate for each item. Table 11 reflects the 
demographic distribution of the results of the 205 participants based on age (Levy & Ramim, 
2009).  
Table 11. Descriptive Statistics of Age Groups (N=205) 
Item Frequency Percentage (%) 
Age Faculty   
18 or Under   0    0.0 
19-24   2  6.45 
25-29   0    0.0 
30-34   4 12.90 
35-39   1   3.23 
40-54 13 41.94 
55-59   3   9.68 
60 or older   8  25.81 
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Continued 
Item Frequency Percentage (%) 
Age Students   
18 or Under   5   2.87 
19-24 36 20.69 
25-29 35 20.11 
30-34 22 12.64 
35-39 25 14.37 
40-54 47 27.01 
55-59   2   1.15 
60 or older   2   1.15 
 
The rate of participation from females was 55 versus 150 for males representing a 25% 
participation as presented in Table 12. A similar distribution of gender frequencies has been in a 
number of studies on authentication (Furnell, 2005).  
Table 12. Descriptive Statistics of Gender (N=205) 
Item Frequency Percentage (%) 
Gender   
Female   55 26.8 
Male 150 73.1 
 
The rate of participation from Business, non-degree, and Science represented 84%, while 
participation by academic levels reflected a rate of 77% by sophomores, juniors, and seniors in 
Table 13. 
Table 13. Descriptive Statistics for Student Degree Major (N=205) 
Item Frequency Percentage (%) 
Degree Major   
Education 19 10.92 
Business 59 33.91 
Arts   3   1.72 
Science 44 25.29 
Religion   4   2.30 
Other 45 25.86 
 
The demographic data indicated an evenly spread level of participation on the part of 
sophomore, junior, and senior groups. This group characterized 76.7% of all participants in 
Table 14. 
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Table 14. Descriptive Statistics of Student Academic Level (N=205) 
Item Frequency Percentage (%) 
Academic Level   
Freshman 19 10.92 
Sophomore 42 24.14 
Junior 51 29.31 
Senior 39 22.41 
Bachelors 10   5.75 
Masters 12   6.90 
Other   1     .57 
The demographic analysis conducted in regards to Participants’ Prior Experience with 
Identity Theft and Participants’ Acquaintance Experience with Identity Theft included a 
frequency distribution and percentage rate for each item. Table 15 reflects the demographic 
distribution of the results of the 205 respondents based on Participants’ Prior Experience with 
Identity Theft and Participants’ Acquaintance Experience with Identity Theft.  
Table 15. Descriptive Statistics of Participants’ Prior Experience with Identity Theft (N=205) 
Item   Frequency Percentage (%) 
Participants’ Prior Experience with Identity Theft 
0 103 50.2 
1 51 24.9 
2-3 39 19.0 
4-5 7   3.4 
6 or more 5   2.4 
 
The rate of occurrence for Participants’ Prior Experience with Identity Theft between zero 
and three represented 94%.  The rate of occurrence for Participants’ Acquaintance Experience 
with Identity Theft between a value of “zero to three” represented 86% in Table 16.  
Table 16. Descriptive Statistics of Participants’ Acquaintance Experience with Identity Theft 
(N=205) 
Item   Frequency Percentage (%) 
Participants’ Acquaintance Experience with Identity Theft 
0 63 30.7 
1 36 17.6 
2-3 78 38.0 
4-5 13    6.3 
6 or more 15    7.3 
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Figure 2. Analysis Results of Means and Standard Deviations for PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS 
based on Age (N=205) 
 
 
Table 17. ANCOVA Results of PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS based on Age 
   ANCOVA  
  df F Sig.  
PVOP Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
197 
1.934 .066  
No significant differences were observed on PVOP based on Age 
F(df=197)=1.934, p=0.066 
 
 
IOP Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
197 
.735 .643  
No significant differences were observed on IOP based on Age 
F(df=197)=.735, p=0.643 
 
  
AC Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
197 
1.362 .223  
No significant differences were observed on AC based on Age 
F(df=197)=1.362, p=0.223 
 
  
RMS Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
197 
2.077 .048 * 
Significant differences were observed on RMS based on Age 
F(df=197)=2.077, P=0.048 
 
* - p < 0.05, ** - p < 0.01, *** - p < 0.001 
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The demographic responses analyzed against PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS in the observed 
survey data for Age used an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). In the ANCOVA, Age was 
treated as the control variable, which was measured against the mean responses for the 29 
questions to see if there were significant differences between the Age groups. Only RMS 
reflected a statistically significance in Table 17.  No other reflected any significant differences. 
Figure 3. Analysis Results of Means and Standard Deviations for PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS 
based on Gender (N=205) 
 
Table 18. ANCOVA Results of PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS based on Gender 
    ANCOVA  
   df F Sig.  
PVOP Between Groups 
Within Groups 
 1 
203 
.659 .418  
 No significant differences were observed on PVOP based on Gender 
F(df=203)=.659, p=0.418 
 
 
IOP Between Groups 
Within Groups 
 1 
203 
4.840 .029 * 
 Significant differences were observed on IOP based on Gender 
F(df=203)=4.840, p=0.029 
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AC Between Groups 
Within Groups 
 1 
203 
.106 .745  
 No significant differences were observed on AC based on Gender 
F(df=203)=.106, p=0.745 
 
   
RMS Between Groups 
Within Groups 
 1 
203 
9.876 .002 ** 
 Significant differences were observed on RMS based on Gender 
F(df=203)=9.876, p=0.002 
 
* - p < 0.05, ** - p < 0.01, *** - p < 0.001 
 
The demographic responses analyzed against PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS in the observed 
survey data for gender used an ANCOVA.  In the ANCOVA, Gender was treated as the control 
variable, which was measured against the mean responses for the 29 questions to see if there 
were significant differences between the gender groups. Both IOP and RMS reflected a 
statistically significance difference in Table 17. No other reflected any significant differences. 
Figure 4. Analysis Results of Means and Standard Deviations for PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS 
based on Degree Major (N=205)
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Table 19. ANCOVA Results of PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS based on Degree Major 
   ANCOVA  
  df F Sig.  
PVOP Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
203 
.659 .418  
No significant differences were observed on PVOP based on Degree Major  
F(df=203)=.659, p=0.418 
 
 
IOP Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
203 
4.840 .029 * 
Significant differences were observed on IOP based on Degree Major  
F(df=203)=4.840, p=0.029 
 
AC Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
203 
.106 .745  
No significant differences were observed on AC based on Degree Major 
F(df=203)=.106, p=0.745 
 
  
RMS Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
203 
9.876 .002 ** 
Significant differences were observed on RMS based on Degree Major 
F(df=203)=9.876, p=0.002 
 
* - p < 0.05, ** - p < 0.01, *** - p < 0.001 
 
The demographic responses analyzed against PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS in the observed 
survey data for Degree Major used an ANCOVA. In the ANCOVA, Degree Major was treated as 
the control variable, which was measured against the mean responses for the 29 questions to see 
if there were significant differences between the Degree Major groups. Both IOP and RMS 
reflected a statistically significance difference in Table 19. No other reflected any significant 
differences.   
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Figure 5. Analysis Results of Means and Standard Deviations for Academic Level on PVOP, 
IOP, AC, on RMS (N=205) 
 
 
Table 20. ANCOVA Results of PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS based on Academic Level 
    ANCOVA  
  df  F Sig.  
PVOP Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
198 
 .823 .553  
 No significant differences were observed on PVOP  
based on Academic Level 
F(df=198)=.823, p=0.553 
 
 
IOP Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
198 
 1.931 .077  
 No significant differences were observed on IOP  
based on Academic Level  
F(df=198)=1.931, p=0.077 
 
   
AC Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
198 
 1.912 .081  
 No significant differences were observed on AC  
based on Academic Level 
F(df=198)=1.912, p=0.081 
 
   
RMS Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
198 
 2.221 .043 * 
 Significant differences were observed on RMS 
based on Academic Level 
F(df=198)=2.221, p=0.043 
 
* - p < 0.05, ** - p < 0.01, *** - p < 0.001 
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The demographic responses analyzed against PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS in the observed 
survey data for academic level used an ANCOVA.  In the ANCOVA, Academic Level was 
treated as the control variable, which was measured against the mean responses for the 29 
questions to see if there were significant differences between the academic levels groups.  Both 
IOP and RMS reflected a statistically significance difference in Table 20. No other variables 
reflected any significant differences.  
Figure 6. Analysis Results of Means and Standard Deviations for PVOP, IOP, AC, on RMS 
based on Participants’ Prior Experience with Identity Theft (N=205) 
 
Table 21. ANCOVA Results of PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS based on Participants’ Prior 
Experience with Identity Theft 
   ANCOVA  
  df F Sig.  
PVOP Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
200 
.359 .838  
No significant differences were observed on PVOP based on Participants’ Prior 
Experience with Identity Theft (F(df=200)=.359, p=.838) 
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IOP Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
200 
1.122 .347  
No significant differences were observed on IOP based on Participants’ Prior 
Experience with Identity Theft (F(df=200)=1.122, p=.347) 
 
  
AC Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
200 
1.920 .109  
No significant differences were observed on AC based on Participants’ Prior 
Experience with Identity Theft (F(df=200)=1.920, p=.109) 
 
  
RMS Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
200 
.634 .639  
No significant differences were observed on RMS based on Participants’ Prior 
Experience with Identity Theft (F(df=200)=.634, p=.639) 
 
* - p < 0.05, ** - p < 0.01, *** - p < 0.001 
 
The demographic responses analyzed against PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS in the observed 
survey data for Participants’ Prior Experience with Identity Theft used an ANCOVA. In the 
ANCOVA, Participants’ Prior Experience with Identity Theft was treated as the control variable, 
which was measured against the mean responses for the 29 questions to see if there were 
significant differences between the Participants’ Prior Experience with Identity Theft group.  
None of the variables displayed any statistically significance difference in Table 21.  
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Figure 7. Analysis Results of Means and Standard Deviations for PVOP, IOP, AC, RMS based 
on Participants’ Acquaintance Experience with Identity Theft (N=205) 
 
Table 22. ANCOVA Results of PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS Based on Participants’ Acquaintance 
Prior Experience with Identity Theft 
   ANCOVA  
  df F Sig.  
PVOP Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
200 
.426 .790  
No significant differences were observed on PVOP based on Participants’ 
Acquaintance Prior Experience with Identity Theft (F(df=200)=.426, p=.790) 
 
 
IOP Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
200 
2.462 .047 * 
Significant differences were observed on IOP based on Participants’ Acquaintance 
Prior Experience with Identity Theft (F(df=200)=2.462, p=.047*) 
 
  
AC Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
200 
.478 .752  
No significant differences were observed on AC based on Participants’ 
Acquaintance Prior Experience with Identity Theft (F(df=200)=.478, p=.752) 
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RMS Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
200 
.262 .902  
No significant differences were observed on RMS based on Participants’ 
Acquaintance Prior Experience with Identity Theft (F(df=200)=.262, p=.902) 
 
* - p < 0.05, ** - p < 0.01, *** - p < 0.001 
 
The demographic responses analyzed against PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS in the survey data 
for Participants’ acquaintance experience with identity theft used an ANCOVA. In the 
ANCOVA, Participants’ Acquaintance Prior Experience with Identity Theft was treated as the 
control variable, which was measured against the mean responses for the 29 questions to see if 
there were significant differences between the Participants’ Acquaintance Prior Experience with 
Identity Theft. IOP was the only variable that displayed any statistically significance difference 
in Table 21. No other variables reflected any significant differences.  
Table 23. T-Test Interaction Results for PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS based on Student vs. Faculty  
   df F Sig.  
PVOP Between Groups 
Within Groups 
 1 
203 
.218 .641  
No significant differences were observed on PVOP based on Student- Faculty 
(F(df=203)=1.380, p=0.242) 
 
 
IOP Between Groups 
Within Groups 
 1 
203 
4.142 .043 * 
Significant differences were observed on IOP based on Student vs Faculty 
(F(df=203)=.001, p=0.972) 
 
   
AC Between Groups 
Within Groups 
 1 
203 
.304 .582  
No significant differences were observed on AC based on Student vs Faculty 
(F(df=203)=28.487, p<0.001***) 
 
RMS Between Groups 
Within Groups 
 1 
203 
1.158 .283  
No significant differences were observed on RMS based on Student vs Faculty 
(F(df=203)=9.870, p=0.002***) 
 
* - p < 0.05, ** - p < 0.01, *** - p < 0.001 
 
Table 23 indicates that there is a statistically significant interaction between IOP on Student 
vs. Faculty. The results indicate an interaction and rejection of the hypothesis H6.   
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Table 24. T-Test Interaction Results for Means and Standard Deviation of PVOP, IOP, AC, and 
RMS based on Student vs. Faculty 
   N Mean Std. Deviation 
PVOP 1.00 
2.00 
 174 
  31 
6.597 
6.526 
  .693 
1.118 
IOP 1.00 
2.00 
 174 
  31 
2.990 
3.424 
1.095 
1.091 
AC 1.00 
2.00 
 174 
  31 
3.434 
3.540 
  .990 
  .936 
RMS 1.00 
2.00 
 174 
  31 
2.967 
3.205 
1.156 
  .990 
1.00 (Student), 2.00 (Faculty) 
  
Table 24 indicates the following differences between the means on Student vs Faculty: 
PVOP has no significant difference in the means of the two groups. 
IOP has the most significant difference in the means of the two groups at .43.  
AC has no significant difference in the means of the two groups. 
RMS has no significant difference in the means of the two groups at .24. 
Table 25. T-Test Interaction Results for PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS based on MMAS or Not 
  df F Sig.  
PVOP Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
203 
1.380 .242  
No significant differences were observed on PVOP based on MMAS or Not 
(F(df=203)=1.380, p=0.242) 
 
 
IOP Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
203 
.001 .972  
No significant differences were observed on IOP based on MMAS or Not 
(F(df=203)=.001, p=0.972) 
 
  
AC Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
203 
28.487 .000 *** 
Significant differences were observed on AC based on MMAS or Not 
(F(df=203)=28.487, p<0.001****) 
 
  
RMS Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
203 
9.870 .002 ** 
Significant differences were observed on RMS based on MMAS vs. Not 
(F(df=203)=9.870, P=0.002 
 
* - p < 0.05, ** - p < 0.01, *** - p < 0.001 
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Table 25 indicates that the t-test Interaction Results for PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS based on 
MMAS or Not, reflect a statistically significant difference between AC and RMS. The results 
indicate a rejection of the hypothesis H6.  
Table 26. T-Test Interaction Results for Means and Standard Deviation of PVOP, IOP, AC, and 
RMS based on MMAS or Not 
  N Mean Std. Deviation 
PVOP 0.00 
1.00 
105 
100 
6.524 
6.651 
  .928 
  .554 
IOP 0.00 
1.00 
105 
100 
3.058 
3.053 
1.071 
1.140 
AC 0.00 
1.00 
105 
100 
3.785 
3.098 
  .929 
  .912 
RMS 0.00 
1.00 
105 
100 
3.241 
2.754 
1.174 
1.038 
0.00 (NOT), 1.00 (MMAS) 
 
Table 26 indicates the following differences between the means on MMAS or Not: 
PVOP has no significant difference in the means of the two groups. 
IOP has no significant difference in the means of the two groups.  
AC has significant difference in the means of the two groups at .69. 
RMS has significant difference in the means of the two groups at .49. 
This indicates a very positive response in the use and acceptance of the MMAS authentication 
method. 
 
Summary of Results  
In this chapter, a thorough statistical analysis was conducted based on the data collected from 
the Web-based survey in order to answer the eleven hypotheses in this study. The detailed 
methodology consisted of a four phase process for this study. Phase I was an exploratory 
research of pertinent literature relating to IS, multi-method authentication, identity theft, security, 
trust, and resistance fields. This information was presented in Table 1 to develop four new 
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survey instruments adapted from previous studies. Phase II detailed the use of the Delphi Method 
as presented in Table 2, for implementing an expert panel to present feedback on the validity and 
reliability of the survey instrument. The results of the expert panel were presented in Table 3 
revealing the recommendations and revisions to produce the final survey instruments to collect 
data for this study. The final survey instruments are found in Appendix A-D. Phase III details the 
inviting of survey participants, pre-survey selection, video training, and survey instructions that 
prepared participants for the survey. More than 650 email invitations were disseminated with a 
response of 206, representing a 33% acceptance rate. Phase IV described the collection, and 
converting of the data for various forms of analysis.  
Upon completion of the pre-analysis data screening, testing for data accuracy, response-set, 
missing data, and multivariate outliers was completed. Mahalanobis Distance (D2) values were 
computed for all 206 cases, with one outlier being identified and removed. The validity and 
reliability of the survey instruments were measured. Content validity, construct validity, and 
external validity measures were assured by establishing the survey items on previously validated 
scales from the literature. Cronbach’s α reliability tests were performed for the independent and 
dependent variables to determine how well the survey items were internally consistent with each 
other. The results reflected a high internal reliability for the items in each variable. A statistical 
analyses was performed to confirm that the pre-analysis data screening was done to ensure the 
accuracy of the data collected from the Web-based survey. 
Subsequently, the relevance of the main research question showing the effect of PVOP, IOP, 
and AC on RMS were presented. To begin with, the data collection procedures were presented, 
followed by results of the multiple regression analysis.  The MLR analysis verified that no 
variables were collinear. As a result of no collinearity, the MLR model data was presented: 
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RMS = 3.356 - .356*PVOP + .097*IOP + .492*AC 
Following the pre-analysis data screening, as well as validity and reliability tests, descriptive 
statistics for the variables were calculated. These included the mean, standard deviation, and 
significance. Frequency distribution histograms provided evidence that the variables were 
normally distributed. MLR and correlation analysis were performed to answer the main research 
question of the study. Pearson correlation analysis and visual inspection of the matrix of scatter 
plots indicated that the relationship between the independent variables PVOP, IOP, AC, and 
dependent variable RMS, were linear, at p < .01.  
The independent variable IOP was determined not to be statistically significantly related to 
the dependent variable. This model predicted a moderate proportion of the variance in RMS, 
reflected by the adjusted R˄2 = .281. RMS increased significantly at p < .05 level with respect to 
AC and PVOP, while IOP was not a significant predictor of RMS. This model did not violate the 
statistical assumptions of MLR with respect to residual normality or homogeneity of variance. 
By comparing the magnitudes of the standardized regression coefficients, AC was recognized as 
a more significant predictor of RMS than was PVOP or IOP.  
Then, the ANOVA test of relevance on the main research question and the hypotheses 
reflecting the effect of PVOP, IOP, and AC on RMS were presented as not statistically 
significant. ANCOVA testing was conducted to measure the influence of each of the control 
variables, “Age, gender, degree major, academic level, Participants’ prior experience with 
identity theft, and Participants’ acquaintance experience with identity theft” on PVOP. IOP, and 
AC on RMS. This testing included interaction between the variables and f-tests and their 
significance. In addition, graphical charts were presented reflecting the levels of means and 
standard deviations. 
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According to Shevade and Keerthi (2003) as well as Komarek and Moore (2004), 
approximately 100 participants are generally required to achieve statistically significant results in 
regression analysis. The goal of achieving over the minimum level of participation for this study 
was accomplished with 206 participants, which demonstrated the need for a power analysis was 
not necessary. This justified the elimination of a power analysis. A summary of the quantitative 
analysis findings for the research hypotheses are summarized in Table 27.   
Table 27. A Summary of the Research Question, Hypotheses, and Findings 
Hypotheses Data Analysis Findings 
MLR Model 
 
Descriptive Statistics of 
Means and Standard Deviations 
MLR Coefficients to Predict RMS  
Collinearity Statistics to Predict RMS 
Cronbach, Histogram, Scatter Plot 
 
 
 
 
Model normally distributed,  linear 
with one response-set removed 
 
Table 4, Page 57 
Table 5, Page 58 
Table 6, Page 59 
Table 7: Page 59 
Table 8: Page 58 
PVOP p<.0001 *** 
IOP     p=.003 ** 
AC      p<.0001 *** 
 
MLR Coefficients 
PVOP p<.0001 *** 
IOP     p<.0001 *** 
RMS   p<.0001 *** 
 
H1  
PVOP 
Research Goal #1 
 
Matrix of Pearson Correlation of 
Coefficients was used to calculate 
Significance  
 
Inverse slope  
Rejected Hypotheses  
PVOP p<.0001 *** 
IOP     p<.0001 *** 
RMS   p<.0001 *** 
Table 6, Page 59 
 
H2  
IOP 
Research Goal #2 
 
Matrix of Pearson Correlation of 
Coefficients was used to calculate 
Significance  
 
Rejected Hypotheses 
PVOP p<.0001 *** 
IOP     p<.0001 *** 
RMS   p<.0001 *** 
Table 6, Page 59 
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Continued 
H3  
AC 
Research Goal #3 
 
Matrix of Pearson Correlation of 
Coefficients was used to calculate 
Significance  
Rejected Hypotheses 
PVOP p<.0001 *** 
IOP     p<.0001 *** 
RMS   p<.0001 *** 
Table 6, Page 59 
   
   
H4  
RMS Interaction 
Research Goal #4 
 
 
 
H5a  
Age 
Research Goal #5 
ANOVA Test of Between Subject 
Effects Significance 
 
 
 
 
Analysis Results for Means and 
Standard Deviations of PVOP, IOP, 
AC, and RMS based on Age 
Not Rejected Hypotheses 
PVOP*IOP*AC 
p=.174  
Not Statistically Significant 
Table 9, Page 61 
 
Figure 2, Page 63 
 
 
 
ANCOVA Results of PVOP, IOP, AC, 
and RMS based on Age  
 
Rejected Hypotheses  
RMS p=.048 * 
Table 16, Page 64 
18 or under demonstrated 
highest levels of IOP, AC, and 
RMS 
 
H5b  
Gender 
Research Goal #5 
 
 
Analysis Results for Means and 
Standard Deviations of PVOP, IOP, 
AC, and RMS based on Gender 
 
ANCOVA Results of PVOP, IOP, AC, 
and RMS based on Gender 
 
Figure 3. Page 65 
 
 
 
Rejected Hypotheses 
IOP   p=.029 * 
RMS p=.002 ** 
Table 17, Page 65 
 
H5c  
Degree Major 
Research Goal #5 
 
 
Analysis Results for Means and 
Standard Deviations of PVOP, IOP, 
AC, and RMS based on Degree Major 
 
ANCOVA Results of PVOP, IOP, AC, 
and RMS based on Degree Major  
 
 
 
Figure 4, Page 66 
 
 
 
Rejected Hypotheses 
IOP   p=.029 * 
RMS p=.002 ** 
Table 18, Page 66 
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Continued   
H5d 
Academic Level 
Research Goal #5 
 
Analysis Results for Means and 
Standard Deviations of PVOP, IOP, 
AC, and RMS based on Academic 
Level  
 
ANCOVA Results of PVOP, IOP, AC, 
and RMS based on Academic Level  
 
 
 
Figure 5, Page 67 
 
 
 
 
Rejected Hypotheses 
RMS p=.043 * 
Table 19, Page 68 
Higher levels of education 
reflected lower RMS 
H5e 
Participants’ Prior 
Experience with 
Identity Theft 
Research Goal #5 
 
Analysis Results for Means and 
Standard Deviations of PVOP, IOP, 
AC, and RMS based on Participants’ 
Prior Experience with Identity Theft 
 
ANCOVA Results of PVOP, IOP, AC, 
and RMS based on Participants’ Prior 
Experience with Identity Theft 
 
Figure 6, Page 69 
 
 
 
 
 
Not Rejected Hypotheses 
Not Statistically Significant 
Table 20, Page 69  
 
H5f 
Participants’ 
Acquaintance 
Experience with 
Identity Theft 
Research Goal #5 
 
 
 
 
Analysis Results for Means and 
Standard Deviations of PVOP, IOP, 
AC, and RMS based on Participants’ 
Acquaintance Experience with Identity 
Theft  
 
ANCOVA Results of PVOP, IOP, AC, 
and RMS based on Participants’ 
Acquaintance Prior Experience with 
Identity 
 
Figure 7, Page 20  
 
 
 
 
 
Rejected Hypotheses 
IOP p=.047 * 
Table 21, Page 71 
 
H6  
T-Test Interaction 
Results for  
Student vs Faculty 
Research Goal #6 
 
 
T-Test Interaction Results for 
PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS  
based on Student vs Faculty 
  
T-Test Interaction Results for 
(Means and Standard Deviations) 
of PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS 
based on Student vs Faculty 
 
Rejected Hypotheses 
IOP p=.043 * 
Table 22, Page 72 
 
Faculty and IOP reflected the 
highest means  
Table 23, Page 72 
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Continued 
H6  
T-Test Interaction 
Results for 
MMAS or Not 
Research Goal #6 
 
 
T-Test Interaction Results for 
PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS  
based on MMAS or Not 
 
 
T-Test Interaction Results for 
(Means and Standard Deviations) 
of PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS 
based on MMAS or Not 
 
Rejected Hypotheses 
AC    p<.0001 *** 
RMS p=.002 ** 
Table 24, Page 73 
 
MMAS displayed lowest levels 
of AC and RMS 
Table 25, Page 73 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary  
 
Overview 
In this chapter, conclusions are suggested and discussed based upon the analysis performed 
within this study. The hypotheses are examined in context of the results achieved along with any 
limitations of this study. The implications for the study and the contribution to the body of 
knowledge within the IS field of study related to multi-method authentication is discussed, as 
well as recommendations for future research. Finally, a summary concludes this chapter of the 
study. 
 
Conclusion and Summary of Results 
To reiterate, the research problem investigated was identity-theft (IDT) incidents due to 
breaches of personal identifying information (PII) (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003; 
Zviran & Erlich, 2006). Such PII breaches are significant threats to invasion of privacy (IOP) 
during e-commerce activities by users in public-access environments (Venkatesh et al., 2003; 
Zviran & Erlich, 2006). Kim, Jeong, Kim, and So (2011) identified PII as financial card 
numbers, usernames, passwords, medical records, driver’s licenses, and Social Security numbers 
(Kim et al., 2011). These PII represent targets of online theft during e-commerce activities.  
Resistance to using multi-factor authentication is related to the issue of identity theft due to 
contributing factors of inadequate user authentication (UA) methods (Fichtman, 2001). A 
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national survey conducted by Information Security Education Journal Volume 1 Number 1 
March 2014 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (2008) revealed that 4.7% of American adults 
experienced identity theft that involved the loss of personal identifying information (PII), while 
such numbers appear to grow rapidly every year. Industry responses to combat the aspects of 
identity theft are focused on the verifiable identification of individuals through the development 
of acceptable multi-method authentication systems (Bellah, 2001). While current research has 
shown significant advances in biometric recognition, users continue to resist using biometric 
technology to enhance password security including in institutions of higher-education (Levy & 
Ramim, 2009). This resistance is attributed to concerns related to protecting their PII, invasion of 
privacy (IOP), and authentication complexity (AC). 
The main goal of this proposed research study was to assess empirically individuals’ 
perspectives on the contribution of perceived value of organizational protection of their personal 
identifying information (PII) (PVOP), perceived invasion of privacy (IOP), and authentication 
complexity (AC) on their resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (RMS) in 
public-access environments. The main goal that this research study assessed empirically was 
individuals’ perspectives on the contribution of perceived value of organizational protecting of 
personal identifying information (PII) (PVOP), perceived invasion of privacy (IOP), and 
authentication complexity (AC) on their resistance to using multi-method authentication systems 
(RMS) in public-access environments. To empirically assess the effect of the aforementioned 
variables on individual acceptance of multi-method forms of access authentication in public 
access environments, four Web-based surveys were developed using previously validated scales.  
The target populations of this investigation were faculty and the entire student body of a 
small university on southwestern United States. These groups affected various age, gender, 
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degree majors, and academic levels, Participants’ prior experience with identity theft and 
Participants’ acquaintance experience with identity theft. This resulted in an available 
participation level of 206 participants or 33% response rate. After completing the survey and 
data collection, a careful MLR analysis demonstrated that the theoretical model of this 
investigation predicted RMS 97% of the time. Pearson correlation analysis revealed that PVOP, 
IOP, AC, and RMS were not collinear.  
The main research question (RQ) that this study addressed was: What is the contribution of 
PVOP, IOP, AC, and interaction on individuals’ resistance to using multi-method authentication 
systems in public-access environments?  
According to Levy and Ramim (2009), the acceptance of multi-method authentication 
systems has been applied minimally in the fields of IDT. Additionally, Furnell and Clarke (2012) 
indicated that personal information security research in human aspects of security has not been 
applied efficiently in various public environments. Therefore, this investigation identified a new 
construct: PVOP, IOP, AC, and its effect on RMS, as well as its potential to impact the current 
ongoing levels of IDT in public access environments. The findings of MLR and correlation 
analyses demonstrated that PVOP, IOP, and AC, when associated with the covariates, had 
varying weights in predicting RMS. The findings empirically reaffirm the research reported in 
the literature by Levy and Ramim (2009) that AC is a significant construct that affects RMS in 
public access environments.  
The findings of MLR and correlation analyses indicated that IOP did not have a strong 
weight in predicting RMS. Although the findings reported in the literature by Levy and Ramim 
(2009) asserted that AC is a significant construct that affects RMS, the findings provide 
additional evidence that more research on the factors associated with RMS is warranted. Based 
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on the empirically-validated conceptual model of the relevant factors and their effects on RMS, 
the implications of this investigation for research are significant. The developed theoretical 
model used the variables of PVOP, IOP, and AC to predict RMS, as well as acceptance of multi-
method authentication systems in public access environments. The independent (PVOP, IOP, & 
AC) and dependent (RMS) variables selected for the model were based on a comprehensive 
literature search. As a result, the two main contributions that this investigation makes to the IS 
literature include: (a) the development and empirical validation of a theoretical model for 
predicting RMS in public access environments, and (b) the determination of the most significant 
factors that affect RMS in public access environments. These findings should facilitate the 
understanding of RMS among users of technology in public access environments.  
 
Implications 
The implications of this investigation are threefold. First, the results of this study provide 
guidance for individuals and organizations associated with all methods of authentication in the 
public access domain. The findings contribute knowledge that can be applied to lower user 
resistance to MMAS, as well as to reduce incidences of IDT, user access misuse, and 
organizational failures to protect PII. Second, this investigation provides information that is 
valuable in understanding RMS, that can be used to (a) decrease personal data security breaches; 
(b) improve the level of acceptance of biometrics/smart card use in public access environments; 
(c) prepare through available education and training, for the anticipated changes in MMAS 
resulting from technological advances; and (d) improve compliance with new federal regulations 
that mandate different types of authentication in public access environments. Finally, the 
research model developed as an outcome of this investigation can help MMAS developers 
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understand the variety of factors especially related to authentication complexity and educating 
users on how the use and benefits of MMAS affect the current levels of resistance. Based on this 
study, as well as the existing body of knowledge, users of differing methods of logon 
identification will better understand how to protect themselves and their clients PII from IDT. 
   
Limitations  
In this study, four limitations were identified. First, the participants of this study were 
identified with a university in a student or instructional role. Therefore, the generalizability of 
this investigation might be limited to university academic environments. Additional studies need 
to be done in non-university environments to be able to more broadly generalize the findings of 
this study. Second, the survey for this investigation was completed within a 3-month time period. 
A more lengthy longitudinal study might be needed to measure the effect of MMAS training to 
decrease RMS. Furthermore, MMAS must periodically reassess their methods by minimizing the 
complexity of devices through the use of more mobile devices as a form of identity recognition.  
Third, the data collected was self-reported. Therefore, the reliability of the survey data was 
dependent on the participants’ willingness to report their resistance of MMAS without bias. 
However, the survey responses were checked for data accuracy, response-set, missing data, and 
outliers to reduce the self-report bias.  
Finally, the Web-based survey instrument invitation was disseminated to the participants 
through e-mail, with no special incentive given to complete the survey. To increase the response 
rate, the survey deadline was extended. In addition, two reminders to complete the survey were 
e-mailed to students, faculty and staff. The professors’ willingness to allow students to 
participate, as well as the participants’ willingness to self-select and dedicate the time necessary 
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to complete the survey, may have contributed to the number of surveys completed. Based on this 
self-selection, there may have been an under-representation of student and faculty professionals 
who are not concerned about MMAS or IDT in public access environments.   
 
Recommendations  
Several areas of future research were identified. The current study was restricted to one type 
of survey per participant; and the participant self-selected which instrument to answer. Future 
studies could also explore whether mandatory MMAS for access into a supermarket for shopping 
might have a significant response based on improving the knowledge levels of MMAS for future 
end-users. In addition, researching the perceptions of resistance to MMAS from a broader group 
of public environments (e.g. supermarkets, sports events, concerts, national borders, churches, 
movie theaters, & government buildings) within a single community would provide a richer view 
of differences in MMAS usage and lower RMS within public access environments.  
Testing future participants’ knowledge of their universities’ information security programs 
could be required in subsequent studies. However, the current study assumed that the participants 
had an acceptable and working understanding of their personal university logon method 
requirements. Replicating this investigation to include a wider range of environments that are not 
included in universities (e.g. government, hospitals, & general public access environments) 
would increase the generalizability of the findings.  
Examining additional factors affecting resistance to MMAS usage from the literature, such as 
IDT based on culture (Levy & Ramim, 2009), resistance to change (Smith & Jamieson, 2006), 
and trust (Kim & Ahn, 2007), could also be considered in future research. To ensure that the 
present study remained controllable, these additional variables were not investigated. Therefore, 
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this investigation was not an exhaustive study of all factors that affect RMS. This study 
examined the effect of the independent variables, PVOP, IOP, and AC on the dependent variable, 
RMS, in public access environments.  However, mandatory use of MMAS was not measured. 
Future investigations could measure actual mandatory use of MMAS in public access 
environments.  
Finally, the results of this investigation indicated that RMS in public access environments 
represented in part by the university participants, acknowledged that PVOP, IOP, and AC are 
important factors in achieving reduced MMAS resistance. The literature has reported that 
individuals are not fully complying with the recommended practices for protecting their PII 
during logon activities. Thus, an improved understanding of the importance of protecting PII, 
preventing IOP, and continuing improvement in the reliability of biometric and RFID devices to 
lower access complexity is suggested. Future research examining factors affecting PVOP, IOP, 
and AC could result in knowledge to help ensure curbing of MMAS resistance in public access 
environments.  
 
Summary  
This investigation addressed the research problem that individuals in the U.S. are not fully 
complying with recommended PII behaviors (Furnell & Clarke, 2010; Levy & Ramim, 2009). 
According to Furnell (2009), data security breaches in annual IDT theft reports continue to 
increase. Numerous security, corporate, and government organizations have recently reported 
data security breaches (DataLossDB, 2010; Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2010). Furthermore, 
the rapid growth and use of wireless information technology has created new security issues 
(Connell & Young, 2007; Helms et al., 2008; Thomas & Botha, 2007). Increasing shortcomings 
88 
 
 
 
in PII security related to government, businesses like Target®, and PayPal®, as well as, 
individuals cell phone usage, breach notifications, data transmission standards, investigation of 
complaints, penalties, and enforcement have created liabilities for numerous organizations 
(Brown, 2009a, 2009b; Blades, 2009). As a result of these breaches of PII, Hourihan (2009) and 
Ruzic (2009) indicated that numerous federal, government, banking, academic, medical 
institutions, and corporations have instituted stronger cyber-security compliance measures.  
In conclusion, recent announcements by governments and the banking industry, indicated a 
plan for development and rollout of a new form of authentication utilizing both hand as well as 
forehead authentication starting in the year of 2017 (Dykes, 2016). Moreover, recently it was 
announced that Japan would begin to authenticate with fingerprints as currency for ATM use 
(The Yomiuri Shimbun, 2016). These efforts to minimize IDT may possibly experience forms of 
resistance due to uncertainty over fears of IOP, PVOP, and AC, however, as this study indicates, 
education, and usage with an MMAS method of use with both fingerprint and RFID may lower 
RMS due to a more acceptable form of AC in public access environments. 
Based on a comprehensive review of the literature of PVOP, IOP, and AC, a theoretical 
model was developed to predict whether any of the three IV has any statistically significant 
influence on individuals’ RMS in public access environments. The goal of the study was to 
develop a conceptual model, as presented in Figure 1, based on the analysis of the effect of 
PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS. The main research question (RQ) that this study addressed was: 
What is the contribution of PVOP, IOP, AC, and interaction on individuals’ resistance to using 
multi-method authentication systems in public-access environments?  
The target sample population of this investigation was student, instructors, and staff 
associated with a university. In this study, a 29-item Web-based survey was developed with 
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seven-point Likert-scaled multiple items to determine the factors affecting RMS. The survey was 
developed using a combination of existing and validated scales. The 10 items for PVOP in the 
instrument, PVOP1 to PVOP10, were adapted from the survey items developed and validated by 
Knapp et al. (2007); and six items for IOP support in the instrument, IOP1 to IOP6, were adapted 
from the survey items developed and validated by Lin (2007). Six items for AC in the 
instrument, AC1 to AC6, were developed by consolidating and adapting survey items developed 
and validated by D’Arcy and Hovav (2009); seven items for RMS in the instrument, RMS1 to 
RMS7, were developed by consolidating and adapting survey items developed and validated by 
Knapp et al. (2007).  
Numerous statistical methods, MLR, ANOVA, ANCOVA, t-test, correlation analysis, 
collinearity, Cronbach, Histograms, Normality, Mahalanobis, Outliers, and Scatter Plots were 
used to test the assumptions as well as the conceptual research model of this investigation. The 
theoretical model predicted that AC would have the most significant effect on RMS and, 
therefore, reduce IDT. A total of 205 qualified participants participated in the Web-based survey, 
representing a 33% response rate. Therefore, the results of the investigation demonstrated that 
AC and PVOP were significant predictors of the dependent variable RMS in the MLR model. 
IOP was not as significant a predictor of the dependent variable. MLR analysis indicated that the 
AC independent variable was the most significant predictor of RMS rather than PVOP or IOP.  
A power analysis was not performed to validate as the sample size of 205 used in this 
investigation was adequate to reject the null hypothesis of MLR. Following MLR analysis, the 
results of the investigation were reviewed. Conclusions were discussed and correlated to PVOP, 
IOP, AC, and RMS in regards to technology acceptance and reducing identity theft. Theoretical 
and practical implications of the study were defined. Four limitations of the investigation were 
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identified and summarized. In conclusion, recommendations were presented for future research 
that will build upon the research and extend the body of knowledge in the area of RMS in public 
access areas. 
  
91 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
Survey Instrument for User of Multi-Method Authentication -  
Faculty-Multi-Method Authentication Systems 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
You are invited to take part in a survey regarding multi-method authentication systems for use in 
public access environments. The purpose of this study is to measure your overall perceptions of 
using multi-method forms of authentication for security while conducting e-commerce activities 
in public access environments. Your participation in this survey is voluntary and completely 
anonymous. Responding and submitting your responses to the survey questions indicates 
voluntary participation in the study. 
 
The survey should take between 15 to 25 minutes to complete. All responses will be kept 
confidential. Your survey response is vital to the improvement of reducing identity theft and 
protecting your personal identifying information by reducing invasion of your privacy through a 
more efficient means of authenticating your access methods. Thank you for your interest and 
participation in this survey. 
 
Sincerely, 
Joseph Marnell, Ph.D. Candidate 
Nova Southeastern University  
Graduate School of Computer & Information Sciences 
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Section A. Perceived Value of Organizational Protection (PVOP) of Personal Identifying Information 
(PII) 
Please rate the level of importance you feel about the following statements from (1) Not Important to (7) 
Extremely Important in regards to having the university protecting your Personal Identifying 
Information (PII) 
Item Not 
Important 
 (1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP1: 
Preventing 
unauthorized 
access to your PII 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP2: 
Prevent theft of 
your PII 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP3: 
Prevent the use of 
your PII without 
your consent 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP4: 
Prevent the 
collection of your 
PII during online 
transactions with 
the school 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP5: 
Prevent the 
interception of your 
online transactions 
with the school 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP6: 
Prevent the ability 
of university 
personnel to 
manipulate or 
change your PII on 
the university 
information 
systems without 
your consent  
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP7: 
Prevent the ability 
of university 
personnel to 
preserve your 
online transaction 
PII for their 
personal interest 
without your 
consent 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
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Item Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP8: 
Prevent Internet 
hackers from 
having access into 
your PII on the 
university’s 
information system 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
     PVOP9: 
Prevent Internet 
hackers from theft 
of your PII from 
the university’s 
information system 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
    PVOP10: 
Prevent Internet 
hackers from 
having the ability 
to intercept, hide, 
or manipulate some 
part of your PII 
from the 
university’s 
information 
systems 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
 
 
Section B. Invasion of Privacy (IOP) 
Please rate the level of importance you feel about the following statements from (1) Strongly Disagree to 
(7) Strongly Agree in regards to having the university protect you from Invasion of Privacy (IOP) 
Items Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP1: 
Protecting my 
personal data isn’t 
my responsibility 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP2: 
I will not use 
university systems 
for registration  
because of privacy 
threats 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP3: 
Securing my 
privacy impedes 
use of my computer 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP4: 
I don’t have time to 
deal with privacy 
issues 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
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Items Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP5: 
I don’t know how 
to secure my 
information on my 
computer 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP6: 
I don’t understand 
the privacy threats 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
 
 
Section C. Authentication Complexity (AC) 
 
Please rate the level of importance you feel about the following statements from (1) Strongly Disagree to 
(7) Strongly Agree in regards to having the university provide multi-method authentication systems 
(MMAS) with minimal Authentication Complexity (AC) 
Items Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC1: 
MMAS is more 
complex to use 
than previous 
forms of password 
identification  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC2: 
MMAS requires 
too much time for 
log-in 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC:3 
There are too many 
MMAS devices 
required to use  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC4: 
MMAS would 
require me to carry 
additional 
identification with 
me at all times to 
log-in 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC5: 
MMAS  are not 
accurate enough 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC6: 
MMAS is more 
complex than just 
facial recognition 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
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Section D. Resistance to using multi-method authentication system (RMS) 
Please rate the level of importance you feel about the following statements from (1) Strongly Disagree to 
(7) Strongly Agree in regards to your resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (MMAS) 
for university identification 
Items Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS1:  
I am opposed due 
to MMAS 
requiring skill 
changes 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS2: 
I am opposed to 
using any MMAS 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS3: 
I prefer my 
previous 
authentication 
methods as it is 
easier 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS4: 
I am opposed to 
MMAS to protect 
my PII 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS5: 
I am opposed to 
using MMAS due 
to process 
uncertainty 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS6:  
I am opposed to  
using MMAS due 
to privacy concerns 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS7: 
My opposition to 
MMAS will 
influence my 
attendance of the  
university 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
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Section E. Demographic information. 
 
Gender:      Male       Female  
Age:       18 or under       19-24      25-29      30-34   
       35-39       40-54      55-59      60 or older  
 
Degree Major    Education       Business          Arts                 Science             
   Religion       Mathematics        Other     
 
Academic Level  Freshman  Sophomore        Junior           Senior      
   Bachelors Masters   Other         
  
How man incidents of any form of privacy intrusion or identity theft have you experienced? 
 0       1        2-3         4-5         6 or more  
 
How man incidents of any form of privacy intrusion or identity theft has anyone in your family, 
at work, school, or an acquaintance experienced?  
 0       1        2-3         4-5         6 or more  
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Appendix B 
 
Survey Instrument for User of Multi-Method Authentication -  
Faculty-User/Password Method 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
You are invited to take part in a survey regarding multi-method authentication systems for use in 
public access environments. The purpose of this study is to measure your overall perceptions of 
using multi-method forms of authentication for security while conducting e-commerce activities 
in public access environments. Your participation in this survey is voluntary and completely 
anonymous. Responding and submitting your responses to the survey questions indicates 
voluntary participation in the study. 
 
The survey should take between 15 to 25 minutes to complete. All responses will be kept 
confidential. Your survey response is vital to the improvement of reducing identity theft and 
protecting your personal identifying information by reducing invasion of your privacy through a 
more efficient means of authenticating your access methods. Thank you for your interest and 
participation in this survey. 
 
Sincerely, 
Joseph Marnell, Ph.D. Candidate 
Nova Southeastern University  
Graduate School of Computer & Information Sciences 
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Section A. Perceived Value of Organizational Protection (PVOP) of Personal Identifying Information 
(PII) 
Please rate the level of importance you feel about the following statements from (1) Not Important to (7) 
Extremely Important in regards to having the university protecting your Personal Identifying 
Information (PII) 
Item Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP1: 
Preventing 
unauthorized 
access to your PII 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP2: 
Prevent theft of 
your PII 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP3: 
Prevent the use of 
your PII without 
your consent 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP4: 
Prevent the 
collection of your 
PII during online 
transactions with 
the school 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP5: 
Prevent the 
interception of your 
online transactions 
with the school 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP6: 
Prevent the ability 
of university 
personnel to 
manipulate or 
change your PII on 
the university 
information 
systems without 
your consent  
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP7: 
Prevent the ability 
of university 
personnel to 
preserve your 
online transaction 
PII for their 
personal interest 
without your 
consent 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
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Item Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP8: 
Prevent Internet 
hackers from 
having access into 
your PII on the 
university’s 
information system 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
     PVOP9: 
Prevent Internet 
hackers from theft 
of your PII from 
the university’s 
information system 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
    PVOP10: 
Prevent Internet 
hackers from 
having the ability 
to intercept, hide, 
or manipulate some 
part of your PII 
from the 
university’s 
information 
systems 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
 
 
Section B. Invasion of Privacy (IOP) 
Please rate the level of importance you feel about the following statements from (1) Strongly Disagree to 
(7) Strongly Agree in regards to having the university protect you from Invasion of Privacy (IOP) 
Items Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP1: 
Protecting my 
personal data isn’t 
my responsibility 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP2: 
I will not use 
university systems 
for registration  
because of privacy 
threats 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP3: 
Securing my 
privacy impedes 
use of my computer 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP4: 
I don’t have time to 
deal with privacy 
issues 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
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Items Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP5: 
I don’t know how 
to secure my 
information on my 
computer 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP6: 
I don’t understand 
the privacy threats 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
 
 
Section C. Authentication Complexity (AC) 
 
Please rate the level of importance you feel about the following statements from (1) Strongly Disagree to 
(7) Strongly Agree in regards to having the university provide multi-method authentication systems 
(MMAS) with minimal Authentication Complexity (AC) 
Items Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC1: 
MMAS is more 
complex to use 
than previous 
forms of password 
identification  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC2: 
MMAS requires 
too much time for 
log-in 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC:3 
There are too many 
MMAS devices 
required to use  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC4: 
MMAS would 
require me to carry 
additional 
identification with 
me at all times to 
log-in 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC5: 
MMAS  are not 
accurate enough 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC6: 
MMAS is more 
complex than just 
facial recognition 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
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Section D. Resistance to using multi-method authentication system (RMS) 
Please rate the level of importance you feel about the following statements from (1) Strongly Disagree to 
(7) Strongly Agree in regards to your resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (MMAS) 
for university identification 
Items Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS1:  
I am opposed due 
to MMAS 
requiring skill 
changes 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS2: 
I am opposed to 
using any MMAS 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS3: 
I prefer my 
previous 
authentication 
methods as it is 
easier 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS4: 
I am opposed to 
MMAS to protect 
my PII 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS5: 
I am opposed to 
using MMAS due 
to process 
uncertainty 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS6:  
I am opposed to  
using MMAS due 
to privacy concerns 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS7: 
My opposition to 
MMAS will 
influence my 
attendance of the  
university 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
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Section E. Demographic information. 
 
Gender:      Male       Female  
Age:       18 or under       19-24      25-29      30-34   
       35-39       40-54      55-59      60 or older  
 
Degree Major    Education       Business          Arts                 Science             
   Religion       Mathematics        Other     
 
Academic Level  Freshman  Sophomore        Junior           Senior      
   Bachelors Masters   Other         
  
How man incidents of any form of privacy intrusion or identity theft have you experienced? 
 0       1        2-3         4-5         6 or more  
 
How man incidents of any form of privacy intrusion or identity theft has anyone in your family, 
at work, school, or an acquaintance experienced?  
 0       1        2-3         4-5         6 or more  
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Appendix C 
 
Survey Instrument for User of Multi-Method Authentication –  
Student-Multi-Method Authentication Systems 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
You are invited to take part in a survey regarding multi-method authentication systems for use in 
public access environments. The purpose of this study is to measure your overall perceptions of 
using multi-method forms of authentication for security while conducting e-commerce activities 
in public access environments. Your participation in this survey is voluntary and completely 
anonymous. Responding and submitting your responses to the survey questions indicates 
voluntary participation in the study. 
 
The survey should take between 15 to 25 minutes to complete. All responses will be kept 
confidential. Your survey response is vital to the improvement of reducing identity theft and 
protecting your personal identifying information by reducing invasion of your privacy through a 
more efficient means of authenticating your access methods. Thank you for your interest and 
participation in this survey. 
 
Sincerely, 
Joseph Marnell, Ph.D. Candidate 
Nova Southeastern University  
Graduate School of Computer & Information Sciences 
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Section A. Perceived Value of Organizational Protection (PVOP) of Personal Identifying Information 
(PII) 
Please rate the level of importance you feel about the following statements from (1) Not Important to (7) 
Extremely Important in regards to having the university protecting your Personal Identifying 
Information (PII) 
Item Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP1: 
Preventing 
unauthorized 
access to your PII 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP2: 
Prevent theft of 
your PII 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP3: 
Prevent the use of 
your PII without 
your consent 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP4: 
Prevent the 
collection of your 
PII during online 
transactions with 
the school 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP5: 
Prevent the 
interception of your 
online transactions 
with the school 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP6: 
Prevent the ability 
of university 
personnel to 
manipulate or 
change your PII on 
the university 
information 
systems without 
your consent  
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP7: 
Prevent the ability 
of university 
personnel to 
preserve your 
online transaction 
PII for their 
personal interest 
without your 
consent 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
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Item Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP8: 
Prevent Internet 
hackers from 
having access into 
your PII on the 
university’s 
information system 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
     PVOP9: 
Prevent Internet 
hackers from theft 
of your PII from 
the university’s 
information system 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
    PVOP10: 
Prevent Internet 
hackers from 
having the ability 
to intercept, hide, 
or manipulate some 
part of your PII 
from the 
university’s 
information 
systems 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
 
 
Section B. Invasion of Privacy (IOP) 
Please rate the level of importance you feel about the following statements from (1) Strongly Disagree to 
(7) Strongly Agree in regards to having the university protect you from Invasion of Privacy (IOP) 
Items Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP1: 
Protecting my 
personal data isn’t 
my responsibility 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP2: 
I will not use 
university systems 
for registration  
because of privacy 
threats 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP3: 
Securing my 
privacy impedes 
use of my computer 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP4: 
I don’t have time to 
deal with privacy 
issues 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
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Items Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP5: 
I don’t know how 
to secure my 
information on my 
computer 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP6: 
I don’t understand 
the privacy threats 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
 
 
Section C. Authentication Complexity (AC) 
 
Please rate the level of importance you feel about the following statements from (1) Strongly Disagree to 
(7) Strongly Agree in regards to having the university provide multi-method authentication systems 
(MMAS) with minimal Authentication Complexity (AC) 
Items Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC1: 
MMAS is more 
complex to use 
than previous 
forms of password 
identification  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC2: 
MMAS requires 
too much time for 
log-in 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC:3 
There are too many 
MMAS devices 
required to use  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC4: 
MMAS would 
require me to carry 
additional 
identification with 
me at all times to 
log-in 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC5: 
MMAS  are not 
accurate enough 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC6: 
MMAS is more 
complex than just 
facial recognition 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
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Section D. Resistance to using multi-method authentication system (RMS) 
Please rate the level of importance you feel about the following statements from (1) Strongly Disagree to 
(7) Strongly Agree in regards to your resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (MMAS) 
for university identification 
Items Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS1:  
I am opposed due 
to MMAS 
requiring skill 
changes 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS2: 
I am opposed to 
using any MMAS 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS3: 
I prefer my 
previous 
authentication 
methods as it is 
easier 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS4: 
I am opposed to 
MMAS to protect 
my PII 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS5: 
I am opposed to 
using MMAS due 
to process 
uncertainty 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS6:  
I am opposed to  
using MMAS due 
to privacy concerns 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS7: 
My opposition to 
MMAS will 
influence my 
attendance of the  
university 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
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Section E. Demographic information. 
 
Gender:      Male       Female  
Age:       18 or under       19-24      25-29      30-34   
       35-39       40-54      55-59      60 or older  
 
Degree Major    Education       Business          Arts                 Science             
   Religion       Mathematics        Other     
 
Academic Level  Freshman  Sophomore        Junior           Senior      
   Bachelors Masters   Other         
  
How man incidents of any form of privacy intrusion or identity theft have you experienced? 
 0       1        2-3         4-5         6 or more  
 
How man incidents of any form of privacy intrusion or identity theft has anyone in your family, 
at work, school, or an acquaintance experienced?  
 0       1        2-3         4-5         6 or more  
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Appendix D 
 
Survey Instrument for User of Multi-Method Authentication -  
Student-Username/Password Method 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
You are invited to take part in a survey regarding multi-method authentication systems for use in 
public access environments. The purpose of this study is to measure your overall perceptions of 
using multi-method forms of authentication for security while conducting e-commerce activities 
in public access environments. Your participation in this survey is voluntary and completely 
anonymous. Responding and submitting your responses to the survey questions indicates 
voluntary participation in the study. 
 
The survey should take between 15 to 25 minutes to complete. All responses will be kept 
confidential. Your survey response is vital to the improvement of reducing identity theft and 
protecting your personal identifying information by reducing invasion of your privacy through a 
more efficient means of authenticating your access methods. Thank you for your interest and 
participation in this survey. 
 
Sincerely, 
Joseph Marnell, Ph.D. Candidate 
Nova Southeastern University  
Graduate School of Computer & Information Sciences 
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Section A. Perceived Value of Organizational Protection (PVOP) of Personal Identifying Information 
(PII) 
Please rate the level of importance you feel about the following statements from (1) Not Important to (7) 
Extremely Important in regards to having the university protecting your Personal Identifying 
Information (PII) 
Item Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP1: 
Preventing 
unauthorized 
access to your PII 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP2: 
Prevent theft of 
your PII 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP3: 
Prevent the use of 
your PII without 
your consent 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP4: 
Prevent the 
collection of your 
PII during online 
transactions with 
the school 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP5: 
Prevent the 
interception of your 
online transactions 
with the school 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP6: 
Prevent the ability 
of university 
personnel to 
manipulate or 
change your PII on 
the university 
information 
systems without 
your consent  
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP7: 
Prevent the ability 
of university 
personnel to 
preserve your 
online transaction 
PII for their 
personal interest 
without your 
consent 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
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Item Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
PVOP8: 
Prevent Internet 
hackers from 
having access into 
your PII on the 
university’s 
information system 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
     PVOP9: 
Prevent Internet 
hackers from theft 
of your PII from 
the university’s 
information system 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
    PVOP10: 
Prevent Internet 
hackers from 
having the ability 
to intercept, hide, 
or manipulate some 
part of your PII 
from the 
university’s 
information 
systems 
Not 
Important 
(1) 
Low 
Importance 
(2) 
Slightly 
Important 
(3) 
Neutral 
 
(4) 
Modestly 
Important 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(6) 
Highly 
Important 
(7) 
 
 
Section B. Invasion of Privacy (IOP) 
Please rate the level of importance you feel about the following statements from (1) Strongly Disagree to 
(7) Strongly Agree in regards to having the university protect you from Invasion of Privacy (IOP) 
Items Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP1: 
Protecting my 
personal data isn’t 
my responsibility 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP2: 
I will not use 
university systems 
for registration  
because of privacy 
threats 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP3: 
Securing my 
privacy impedes 
use of my computer 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP4: 
I don’t have time to 
deal with privacy 
issues 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
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Items Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP5: 
I don’t know how 
to secure my 
information on my 
computer 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
IOP6: 
I don’t understand 
the privacy threats 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
 
 
Section C. Authentication Complexity (AC) 
 
Please rate the level of importance you feel about the following statements from (1) Strongly Disagree to 
(7) Strongly Agree in regards to having the university provide multi-method authentication systems 
(MMAS) with minimal Authentication Complexity (AC) 
Items Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC1: 
MMAS is more 
complex to use 
than previous 
forms of password 
identification  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC2: 
MMAS requires 
too much time for 
log-in 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC:3 
There are too many 
MMAS devices 
required to use  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC4: 
MMAS would 
require me to carry 
additional 
identification with 
me at all times to 
log-in 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC5: 
MMAS  are not 
accurate enough 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
AC6: 
MMAS is more 
complex than just 
facial recognition 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
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Section D. Resistance to using multi-method authentication system (RMS) 
Please rate the level of importance you feel about the following statements from (1) Strongly Disagree to 
(7) Strongly Agree in regards to your resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (MMAS) 
for university identification 
Items Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS1:  
I am opposed due 
to MMAS 
requiring skill 
changes 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS2: 
I am opposed to 
using any MMAS 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS3: 
I prefer my 
previous 
authentication 
methods as it is 
easier 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS4: 
I am opposed to 
MMAS to protect 
my PII 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS5: 
I am opposed to 
using MMAS due 
to process 
uncertainty 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS6:  
I am opposed to  
using MMAS due 
to privacy concerns 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
RMS7: 
My opposition to 
MMAS will 
influence my 
attendance of the  
university 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
(3) 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
(5) 
Agree 
 
 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
(7) 
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Section E. Demographic information. 
 
Gender:      Male       Female  
Age:       18 or under       19-24      25-29      30-34   
       35-39       40-54      55-59      60 or older  
 
Degree Major    Education       Business          Arts                 Science             
   Religion       Mathematics        Other     
 
Academic Level  Freshman  Sophomore        Junior           Senior      
   Bachelors Masters   Other         
  
How man incidents of any form of privacy intrusion or identity theft have you experienced? 
 0       1        2-3         4-5         6 or more  
 
How man incidents of any form of privacy intrusion or identity theft has anyone in your family, 
at work, school, or an acquaintance experienced?  
 0       1        2-3         4-5         6 or more  
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Appendix E 
Expert Review Questionnaire 
 
Thanks for participating in this review. Please provide your anonymous feedback regarding 
the research instrument attached. If required, please use additional paper. 
 
1. Are the directions for completing the YES NO 
instrument clear and complete? 
 
If no, please explain 
 
2. Do the items appropriately measure the YES NO 
construct being evaluated? 
 
If no, please explain 
 
 
3. Are there any items that you would recommend revising?  YES       NO 
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If yes, please explain 
 
 
4. Would you recommend deleting any items?      YES       NO 
 
If yes, please explain 
 
5. Would you recommend including any       YES       NO 
additional items in this instrument? 
 
If yes, please explain 
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Appendix F 
E-Mail to Expert Panel 
Dear Information Security Expert,  
My name is Joseph Marnell and I am a Ph.D. candidate at the Graduate School of Computer and 
Information Sciences, Nova Southeastern University. Currently, I am working on my dissertation 
research titled “An Empirical Investigation of Factors Affecting Resistance to Using Multi-
method authentication systems in Public-Access Environments.” This study will attempt to 
assess the aspects of the Perceived Value of Organizational Protection of PII (PVOP), 
authentication complexity (AC), and invasion of privacy (IOP) by individuals in predicting their 
resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (RMS) in public-access environments to 
achieve greater user biometric understanding. The information obtained from this study could 
prove valuable in understanding users’ resistance to using multi-method authentication systems 
within public access environments. 
I am asking you to kindly contribute to this study as a member of an expert panel, by completing 
an anonymous online questionnaire about the Web-based quantitative survey instrument that was 
developed for the study participants. The study participants will include students based on their 
academic level (freshman, sophomore, junior, and senior), primary degree, and an equal 
percentage of each gender. There will be created a control and experimental group of equal size 
as best as possible. Your anonymous participation in this survey will be limited to reviewing the 
Web-based quantitative survey instrument and provide feedback about it.  
 
Attached to this e-mail is a copy of the preliminary quantitative survey instrument. Your 
assistance is being sought, as an expert, to review the preliminary instrument and perform a 
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qualitative evaluation of the instruments validity by answering five questions. Your response to 
these questions will assist in making a determination of whether or not the individual items serve 
to measure the constructs being evaluated and in the identification of additional items that could 
enhance the instrument. Additionally, there will be a general comments section where you can 
provide information on the content and structure of the instrument. Your feedback will be used to 
adjust the attached instrument as required. Your review and feedback should take approximately 
30-45 minutes to complete, however, you may take as much time as you chose. Once completed, 
please click the “Done” button to submit your completed expert panel feedback. Any information 
provided will only be used as part of this study. 
 
If you are willing to participate, please click the link below for access. 
(The survey URL link was inserted here upon the creation of the survey).  
 
Your completion of the expert panel feedback indicates your voluntary participation. If you have 
any questions regarding this study, you may contact me at marnellj@wbu.edu.  
 
Thanks for your consideration and I appreciate your assistance. 
 
Regards, 
 
Joseph W. Marnell, Ph.D. Candidate 
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Appendix G 
Follow-up E-Mail to Expert Panel 
 
My name is Joseph Marnell and I am a Ph.D. Candidate student at the Graduate School of 
Computer and Information Sciences, Nova Southeastern University. Currently, I am working on 
my dissertation research titled “An Empirical Investigation of Factors Affecting Resistance to 
Using Multi-method authentication systems in Public-Access Environments.” Your assistance is 
being sought, as an expert, to review the preliminary instrument and perform a qualitative 
evaluation of the instruments validity by answering five questions. Your response to these 
questions will assist in making a determination of whether or not the individual items serve to 
measure the constructs being evaluated and in the identification of additional items that could 
enhance the instrument. Additionally, there will be a general comments section where you can 
provide information on the content and structure of the instrument. Your feedback will be used to 
adjust the attached instrument as required. The survey should take approximately 30-45 minutes 
to complete; however, you may take as much time as you chose. Once completed, please click 
the “Done” button to submit the completed survey. Any information provided will only be used 
as part of this study. 
 
If you are willing to participate, please click the link below for access. 
(The survey URL link was inserted here upon the creation of the survey) 
However, if you are unable to participate as an expert panel member, please forward an email to 
marnellj@wbu.edu as soon as possible. This will allow time for a possible replacement member 
to be requested to participate. 
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Your completion of the survey indicates your voluntary participation. If you have questions 
regarding this study, you may contact me at marnellj@wbu.edu. 
 
Thanks for your consideration and I appreciate your assistance. 
 
Regards, 
 
Joseph W. Marnell 
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Appendix H 
E-Mail to Main Population 
Dear Students, 
My name is Joseph Marnell and I am a Ph.D. candidate at the Graduate School of Computer and 
Information Sciences, Nova Southeastern University. Currently, I am working on my dissertation 
research titled “An Empirical Investigation of Factors Affecting Resistance to Using Multi-
method authentication systems in Public-Access Environments.”  
I am inviting you to participate in this study as a member of our university, by completing an 
anonymous online survey. Participation in this survey is voluntary, at your discretion, and 
completely anonymous to protect your personal identifiable information and privacy. 
The survey will be comprised of 32 questions. There will be a training period provided as part of 
the survey. The questions should take no more than 15-20 minutes to complete; however, you 
may take as much time as you chose. Once completed, please click the “Done” button to submit 
the completed survey. Any information provided will only be used as part of my research and no 
personally identifiable information is being collected. 
If you are willing to participate, please click the link below for access. 
(The survey URL link will be inserted here upon the creation of the survey) 
Your completion of the survey indicates your voluntary participation. If you have questions 
regarding this study, you may contact me at marnellj@wbu.edu. 
Thanks for your consideration and I appreciate your assistance. 
 
Regards, 
Joseph W. Marnell, Ph.D. Candidate  
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Appendix I 
Follow-up E-Mail to Main Population 
 
My name is Joseph Marnell and I am a Ph.D. student at the Graduate School of Computer and 
Information Sciences, Nova Southeastern University. Currently, I am working on my dissertation 
research titled “An Empirical Investigation of Factors Affecting Resistance to Using Multi-
method authentication systems in Public-Access Environments.”  
 
If you are willing to voluntarily participate, please click the link below for access. 
(The survey URL link was inserted here upon the creation of the survey) 
Participation in this survey is at your discretion and I will not know who completes this survey. 
Your completion of the survey indicates your voluntary participation. If you have questions 
regarding this study, you may contact me at marnellj@wbu.edu. 
This email is being provided to you as a university student as a follow-up request to ask for your 
voluntary participation in my dissertation research. 
If no response is received, a final contact will be offered in class by each faculty member. 
Thanks for your consideration and I appreciate your assistance. 
 
Regards, 
Joseph W. Marnell 
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